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1. INTRODUCTION
Practicality controls and guides the entry and utilization of law
and public policy by lawyers and managers in business decision-mak-
ing that must use both legal analysis and information provided
through legal advice. This article explores how practicality that is the
genesis of a theory of law and business would affect the managerial
entry and utility of law and public policy in business decision-making.
The process of business decision-making is management methodology
that acts as an analytical and informational portal for legal advice,
thus affecting the managerial uses of law and public policy in decision-
making in order to create and manage practices, actions and plans.
This article leaves theoretical and pedagogical frameworks for another
time, and thus limits its observations of a practical framework to the
combined, practical effects of legal methodology and information and
management methodology and thinking which operates simultane-
ously in the process of business decision-making.
The practicality of law and business must provide an effective
entry and utilization of legal analysis and information by practitioners
of law and business directly into business methodology or decision-
making. This practical framework that integrates legal analysis and
business methodology on an analytic level is a legal-managerial frame-
work. The legal-managerial framework delivers and uses legal-manage-
rial ("L-M") analysis and legal information in the process of business
decision-making. The framework relies on pre-decisional evaluation of
laws and policies, utilizing business theories and principles to ascer-
tain the effects of these laws and policies on business methodology
and thinking. It includes an evaluation and stepwise entry and utiliza-
tion of law and public policy in business decision-making.
The legal-managerial framework is difficult to find, explain and
understand. It exists in the uncharted space between law and busi-
ness. But, the coexistence of law and business in time, matter and
logic, without an economic analysis of law, accounts for its existence.
This coexistence creates the need to develop a conceptual framework
to bring logic and rationality to this uncharted space. On one hand,
the absence of a legal-managerial framework that enters law and public
policy in business decision-making results in mostly imprecise deliv-
eries and inexact uses of L-M analysis and legal information in the
process of business decision-making by managers. Presently, the use
of a legal-managerial framework to deliver and use L-M analysis and
2002] 133
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legal information is not in the practice of law and business or their
teaching. On the other hand, the absence of a legal-managerial frame-
work to evaluate the impact of law and public policy on business meth-
odology and thinking results in mostly incomplete L-M analysis and
information before and after the entry and utilization of a particular
law and public policy in the process of business decision-making.
Presently, the pre-decisional utility of business principles and theories
to evaluate the impact of law and public policy on business methodol-
ogy and thinking is not within any study of law and management.
Analytically, these absences of a pre-decisional evaluation and deci-
sional preciseness and exactness in the entry and utilization of L-M
analysis and legal information in business decision-making - an
unguarded Analytic portal - greatly justify consideration of a legal-
managerial framework in the practice, pedagogy and theory of law and
business disciplines.
This article examines the practicality underlying the entry and
utilization of a L-M analysis and legal information into the process of
-business decision-making by lawyers and managers who generally do
not understand or use each others' methodology and thinking, such as
business methods and legal analysis, in their professional works and
practices. The article uses the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 19741 (ERISA) to demonstrate the utility, necessity and validity
of a legal-managerial framework for the delivery and use of L-M analy-
sis and legal information in business decision-making, as well as the
use of business theories and principles to evaluate the impact of law
and public policy on business methodology and thinking. Part I, the
Introduction, strongly suggests the need for greater rationality in the
use of lawyers' advice by business managers in the process of business
decision-making. It recognizes that increasing rationality requires
1. Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 and 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (hereinafter ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), affects both subject matter and methodology of business
disciplines and functions. ERISA analysis and information is legal analysis and legal
information of regulation, common law and public policy. See infra notes 24-78. First,
ERISA analysis includes legal methodology that affects business methodology that is
the process of business decision-making. This process consists of several decisional
steps, and each step has some unique analytical and informational needs. See infra
notes 4 and 7. Second, ERISA includes substantive law or legal information, that
affects the use of analysis and the operation of steps in the process of decision-
making. See infra notes 78-282. ERISA greatly affects other analysis and information,
such as finance and accounting, entering each step of this process and also effects the
outcome of each step.
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entry and exploration into the uncharted space laying directly between
boundaries of legal methodology and business methodology, including
their thinking. Into this space, it enters ERISA and uses it to chart an
integrated framework of those methodologies and thinking. Part 11 dis-
cusses the purpose, nature and scope of the legal-managerial frame-
work for integrating ERISA and other managerial analyses and
information in the process of decision-making. Part III discusses how
competing public interests, market interests and organizational inter-
ests affect plan administration and plan management by causing com-
panies to confront ERISA analysis and information in business
decision-making. Parts I, II and III explain the analytical and informa-
tional nature of ERISA analysis and information under a managerial
analysis of law. These Parts define the nature and role of L-M analysis
and legal information in process of business decision-making, and rec-
ognize business decision-making as the analytical and informational
portal for business functions and other discipline specific approaches.
ERISA analysis and information are not self-executing in the pro-
cess of business decision-making and demonstrate the effects of L-M
analysis and legal information on general decision-making to further
business objectives and goals for organizational effectiveness. Part IV
recognizes that common law thinking and judicial review, which gov-
erns ERISA analysis and information, affect the management and
administration of employee benefits plans and thus affect how lawyers
and managers use legal and management methodologies, respectively,
in making employee benefits plan decisions. Part V explains how
ERISA analysis and information create uncertainty in exercises of cor-
porate authority by requiring decision-making procedures to imple-
ment particular plan decisions. Part VI explains how ERISA analysis
and information increase the decision risks of particular plan deci-
sions by requiring their disclosure and thus making their conse-
quences prematurely public. Parts IV, V and VI illustrate how ERISA
analysis and information affect management methodology and think-
ing by requiring closer scrutiny of plan decisions, imposing decision-
making procedures on plans, and requiring the disclosure of informa-
tion. Part VII, the Conclusion, recognizes that ERISA analysis and
information definitely affect managerial discretion by imposing limits
on management methodology and thinking, such as business decision-
making and principles. It finds a pre-decisional (or process) evalua-
tion and the entry and utility of legal analysis and information in the
process of decision-making requires a legal-managerial framework in
theory, practice and pedagogy. At this time, the article addresses only
the practicality of entering and utilizing a L-M analysis with legal
20021
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information in the process of business decision-making. This practi-
cality includes unbundling legal analysis so that its analytical method-
ology forms a L-M analysis on entry into the process of business
decision-making.
A. Finding Compatibility in the Practicality of Law and Business
In fact, if the delivery and use of legal analysis and information in
the judicial decision-making process takes place in such unstructured
methodology, legal thinkers will find many judicial decisions analyti-
cally unsound on findings of law and facts and the formulation of a
logical rationale. Moreover, one discipline-specific method that
includes analysis and information may not fit the analytical and infor-
mational needs of every step of the decision-making process or other
methodologies. The present framework that delivers and uses legal
analysis and information can be described as Asking-the-Lawyer (ATL)
for legal advice. Lawyers do not make business decisions, nor do they
use management methodologies, such as the process of business deci-
sion-making. Also, the present study of the effects of law on manage-
ment thinking and methodologies that also use the findings of
economics, statistics and other approaches is, at best, a piecemeal
scholarship. Using legal advice through a legal-managerial framework
in business decision-making includes L-M analysis and legal informa-
tion that managers must inevitably evaluate and use in the process of
business decision-making. The legal-managerial framework explains
how managers use legal analysis and information of legal advice so
that the managerial process and substance of legal analysis and infor-
mation match the analytical and informational needs of each step of
the process of business decision-making of managers. This managerial
process is a legal-managerial framework, and the substance is legal
information. Managers must use both process and substance in busi-
ness decision-making.
Lawyers provide legal advice to managers, who use it in making
business decisions and plans for their organizations. Yet neither law
nor management offers a school or field of thinking to study how man-
agers enter and use legal analysis in management methodology and
thinking. Law begins its entry into the process of business decision-
making as legal advice. But if managers must use legal advice, it then
enters the process of business decision-making in the form of L-M
analysis and legal information. Lawyers and managers do not use the
same analytical and informational methodologies. Law is not self-exe-
cuting; someone must use it. From a managerial perspective, both
legal analysis and information must be consistent with the analytical
[Vol. 24:131
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and informational needs of management methodology to produce a
business decision. Combining legal-analytical methodology and busi-
ness decision-making must produce lawful and ethical decisions that
can be justified by the decision situation and further company
objectives.
Lawyers use legal analysis, reasoning and knowledge in providing
legal advice to managers and organizations. Like other students of
jurisprudence, lawyers ascertain legal advice using legal methodology
that possesses a coherent structure and substance through analyzing
facts and law, formulating issues and fashioning rationales. Moreover,
legal-analytic methodology is too sophisticated for the novice manager
or executive. But mere legal advice lacks a coherent framework or
structure to integrate or mesh with the nature of managerial analysis
and information entering each step of the process of business deci-
sion-making. Managers need an integrated analysis to guide the pre-
cise delivery and exact use of legal information (statutes and other
legal rules) and analyses (issue, situational and rule analyses) in the
process of decision-making. Managers would be better served by a
legal-managerial (L-M) analysis to use legal advice that, now, includes
analysis that is congruent with and attaches directly to information
entering the business decision-making. L-M analysis and legal infor-
mation are inherent parts of a broad legal-managerial framework that
uses business theories and principles to evaluate the impact of law and
public policy on business methodology and thinking and that enters
law and policy into the process of business decision-making. I refer to
the use of the legal-managerial framework as a managerial analysis
with law.
A managerial analysis with law includes an integrated analysis
that attaches to the delivery of legal information in order to affect its
entry and use in the process of decision-making. L-M analysis inte-
grates management methodology and elementary legal methodology
(analysis) to assess continuously the analytical and informational
needs of each step of the decision-making process. L-M analysis ascer-
tains changes caused by new circumstances and influences on the
decision situation, selection of the decision or other steps of the pro-
cess of decision-making process. New circumstances in the decision
situation or another step may require new legal advice or render past
legal advice ineffective to effect the desired results of a decision. L-M
analysis permits managers to seek legal advice more timely, precisely
and accurately throughout the process of decision-making. The effec-
tive use of legal advice depends on the delivery and use of legal infor-
mation and legal-managerial (L-M) analysis in each step of the process
2002]
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of business decision-making. On one hand, a part of L-M analysis is
legal methodology that routinely analyzes factual patterns, determines
the fit between a decision and its ends, and ascertains the implications
of decisions. On the other hand, a part of L-M analysis is management
methodology that routinely requires the definition of situations, an
examination of alternatives, and the determination of decisional con-
sequences. The integration of management and elementary legal
methodologies forms a legal-analytic methodology. This integrated
methodology precisely delivers and accurately uses L-M analysis and
legal information in the business decision-making. Integrated method-
ology uses legal-analytical methods to provide more particular infor-
mation and thinking in each decisional step. These methods
complement each step of management methodology by forming and
providing unique L-M analysis to accompany legal information, which
in turn produces more specific findings and thinking for a decisional
step. These methods are aids in analyzing situations and issues, coor-
dinating the decision-objective fit and selecting and implementing
decisions in the decision-making process. Making business decisions
is management practice. Yet the entry of legal-analytical methods and
the formation of L-M analysis to accompany legal information in the
process of decision-making are not the first level in legal-managerial
framework.
B. Weighing the Law and Public Policy Before the Need for a Decision
An earlier level in the legal-managerial framework is the evalua-
tion of law and public policy using business concepts rather than fac-
tual circumstances. Analytically, such an evaluation must precede the
entry of legal-analytical methods and formation of L-M analysis accom-
panying legal information into the process of business decision-mak-
ing. Such a pre-decisional evaluation studies the managerial effects of
law and public policy on managerial discretion, before managers ever
consider using L-M analysis and legal information in the process of
business decision-making. Examining law and public policy only on
the occurrence of specific circumstances is not an examination using
management concepts, which should explain and guide managerial
actions in business situations and environments. Law and public pol-
icy can impose unreasonable restraints on managerial discretion and
thus restrain the use of L-M analysis and information to effect steps in
the process of business decision-making. Such analysis and informa-
tion can aid in examining the decision situation and evaluating alter-
natives. Such an evaluation analyzes and ascertains those restraints of
a specific rule of law and then deduces or infers the range of manage-
8
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rial discretion or judge (practicality) that should be available under
this particular law through the process of decision-making.
The use of business theories and principles to evaluate a particu-
lar law and policy produces L-M analysis and legal information on the
specific impact of a particular law or policy on management methodol-
ogy and thinking. This pre-decisional evaluation must precede the
delivery and use of L-M analysis and legal information in the process
of business decision-making. L-M analysis attaches to the delivery of
legal information that should have been evaluated by business theories
before a need arose for its use in the process of decision-making. Busi-
ness concepts include established business principles that business
practitioners and scholars declare or attest are valid in business prac-
tices. These concepts include employee retention, organizational flexi-
bility and organizational effectiveness. There must be logical or
rational concepts underpinning managerial actions, other than a fac-
tual or situational analysis that could be charged with emotions and
feelings, such as greed. In a managerial analysis with law, the applica-
tion of these concepts would explain, in part, how any particular statu-
tory provision, administrative regulation or public policy would limit
or support a particular decision situation. To illustrate, organizational
flexibility is the ability of business organizations to respond to market
and organizational demands. Organizational flexibility might evaluate
an employment or labor statute that limits the use of contingent work
relationships in order to ascertain how provisions of this particular
statute might affect the use of contingent workers by business organi-
zations. Such an evaluation enhances L-M analysis and produces legal
information. Later this analysis and information would be used in the
process of business decision-making to make decisions regarding con-
tingent work relationships. L-M analysis and legal information are
inseparable in a legal-managerial framework to enter and use law and
public policy as legal information in the process of business decision-
making. The provision of L-M analysis and legal information to man-
agers gives them greater control over the use of law and public policy
in the business decision-making process.
C. Utilizing Law at Any Place and Time in the Decision-Making
Process
The entry of legal analysis and information in the process of busi-
ness decision-making may come too early, too late or no t at all when
legal and management methodologies do not provide for the precise
delivery and exact use of the appropriate L-M analysis and legal infor-
mation. Each step of the business decision-making process is manage-
20021 139
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ment methodology in the determination of a specific means,
possessing unique analytical and informational needs. Each step and
its needs require specific L-M analysis and information to produce par-
ticular findings and thinking in selecting a means to further an objec-
tive. Any one method of L-M analysis and legal information cannot be
used at any step in the business decision-making process. This pro-
cess demands specific L-M analysis and legal information, which pro-
duces particular findings and thinking, to fit the unique analytical and
informational needs of a particular step.
Legal information is not self-executing in the business decision-
making process. When legal information enters the process of busi-
ness decision-making, but is not attached to or accompanied by L-M
analysis, this unaccompanied information greatly reduces the manage-
rial utility of legal-analytic methodology throughout the process of
decision-making. Legal-analytic methodology within the legal-manage-
rial framework provides structure and substance to legal-analytic
methods that form specific L-M analysis that attaches to legal informa-
tion to produce particular findings and thinking, such as assumptions,
conclusions and inferences, within management methodology. Legal-
analytical methods enter a step in the decision-making process to form
specific L-M analysis that makes legal information more usable by
managers. These methods are legal-analytic methodology for the for-
mation of L-M analysis to accompany the entry (or delivery and use) of
legal information in the steps of the business decision-making
process.
Legal advice includes legal analysis and information that manag-
ers rely on to make business decisions, but at any step or moment in
the decision-making process, the use of only legal information or "yes-
terday's advice" may not be relevant under changes in business situa-
tions and environments. There are often managerial needs for new
and timely advice. Situational and environmental changes are only
apparent through knowledge of how law and public policy would be
implicated by new circumstances and information occurring in each
step of the decision-making process. A legal-managerial framework for
the entry of L-M analysis and legal information in business decision-
making should be valid under legal and management methodologies
and thinking, if it provides specific L-M analysis to accompany legal
information before the existence of any decision situation and contin-
ues to provide more specific L-M analysis to accompany legal informa-
tion throughout the process of decision-making.
140 [Vol. 24:131
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II. INTEGRATING METHODOLOGIES IN BUSINESS DECISION-MAKING
Legal-managerial analysis must always accompany the legal and
policy information that managers enter into the process of business
decision-making. In management methodology, L-M analysis and legal
information also produce more particularized findings and thinking in
each step of the decision-making process. Under Asking-the-Lawyer
(ATL), there have been many instances where managers have made
decisions that have not given enough weight or consideration to the
appropriate law or public policy in one or more steps of the decision-
making process. Consequently, a genuine need exists for a legal-mana-
gerial framework that permits the precise delivery and exact use of law
and public policy in the process of business decision-making, while
also allowing a timely theoretical evaluation of the impact of law and
public policy on business methodology and thinking of business
disciplines.
The process of business decision-making is management method-
ology that uses finance, accounting, statistics, economics and other
analytical approaches in the process of managerial analysis to deliver
both discipline-specific analysis and information, such as L-M analysis
and legal information.2 A legal-managerial framework for the intro-
duction and use of law in management methodology and the evalua-
tion of the impact of law on management thinking is conspicuously
absent in theory, practice and pedagogy. A legal-managerial frame-
work includes legal and management methodologies that together
deliver L-M analysis and legal and policy information to produce spe-
cific findings and thinking throughout the decision-making process.
2. Legal analysis and information that jointly produce findings and thinking may
affect the analysis and subject matter of one or more steps in the process of business
decision-making. See infra Part I.B and accompanying notes. ERISA analysis and
information show how law and public policy, which consist of analysis and
information, affect the subject matter (information) and methodology (decisional
steps) of business decision-making.
See Robert E. Schellenberger, MANAGERIAL ANALYSIS 7 (1969). Dr. Schellenberger
states that "[mianagerial analysis is an analytical process which aids or assists the
manager to make decisions." Id. at 7. "It may be said that managerial analysis is the
systematic investigation, compilation, manipulation, and presentation of information
to a decision-maker in order to aid the decision-making process." Id. at 8.
Managerial analysis with law includes both a legal-managerial ("L-M") analysis
and legal and public policy information. L-M analysis is part legal analysis that
consists of legal-analytical methodology, infra note 3, to deliver and use law and
public policy in the process of business decision-making. L-M analysis accompanies
the entry and utilization of legal information into the decision-making process and
aids in finding, analyzing and applying legal and policy information such as rules,
statutes and regulations.
2002]
11
Holloway: The Practical Entry and Utility of a Legal-Managerial Framework w
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002
CAMPBELL LAW REvIEW [Vol. 24:131
Legal-analytic methodology illustrates an analysis that operates in a
methodological process to deliver and use information and works with
this information to produce more specific findings and thinking.
Appendix A illustrates that the legal-managerial framework relies on
the analytical compatibility of legal-analytic methodology and manage-
rial methodology to enter precisely and timely L-M analysis that often
accompanies legal information into the decision-making process.
Legal-analytic methodology on entry into business decision-making
forms L-M analysis, which accompanies legal information, to produce
specific findings and thinking, such as assumptions, conclusions and
inferences.3
3. The use of managerial analysis in legal writing and scholarship is not novel.
Other commentators have recognized the need to conduct a managerial analysis in
preventing antitrust violations in business decision-making and planning.
Shumandine and others state that:
Many newspapers and broadcasters are not familiar with the scope of the
antitrust laws and the possible business consequences of an antitrust
violation. However, as the subsequent sections of this outline will reveal,
there are antitrust considerations in virtually every major business decision
which a newspaper or broadcaster makes. Thus, a working knowledge of the
antitrust laws is essential to an informed managerial analysis of business
alternatives. It is the possible consequences of an antitrust violation which
demands that newspapers and broadcasters pay heed to antitrust
considerations in their business planning. A technical antitrust violation,
even a good faith violation, can have disastrous financial consequences for a
small newspaper or broadcaster and often can stagger even the largest media
conglomerate. Full knowledge of the extreme nature and consequences of an
antitrust violation often sensitizes even the most hardened competitor to the
importance of complying with the antitrust laws.
Conrad M. Shumadine, et al., Antitrust and the Media, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 58-59 (2000). Another
commentator finds that a managerial analysis exists in determining the justifications
for corporate decisions that are made by the board of directors and thus states that:
Given this conflict of interest, the burden is on the managers to show
"reasonable grounds to believe that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed." Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. Ch. 1964).
The directors met this burden by showing that there was a reasonable threat
to the continued existence of the corporation, at least a threat to its existing
form. Id. at 556. In the end, the only way the managers would be liable for
the repurchase of shares at a premium would be if the board "acted solely or
primarily because of the desire to perpetuate themselves in office."' Id. at
554. Since retention of control was not the sole or primary cause for the
payment of greenmail, the directors were protected by the business judgment
rule. The lower level of scrutiny of the managerial analysis and judgment was
easily satisfied. Id. at 555-56.
Marcia L. Walters, Note, Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Will the
Greenmailer Be Held Liable?, 39 Case Western Res. L. Rev. 1271, 1304 (1988/1989). A
142
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A. The Scope of an Integration of Legal and Management
Methodologies
Legal-analytic methodology matches both legal analysis and infor-
mation to the steps of the process of decision-making4 of management
managerial analysis with law offers a legal-managerial framework to evaluate and then
enter (actually deliver and use) law and public policy, through a legal-managerial
analysis accompanying legal and policy information in the process of business
decision-making and planning.
The link between law and other disciplines requires the use of legal analytic
methodology. This link is legal theory. See Richard A. Posner, LAW AND LITERATURE: A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION, X & 9 (1988). Judge Posner states that: "Legal analytic
methods (which centered on the careful reading of legal texts against a background of
comprehensive knowledge of legal doctrines and institutions, and heavily emphasized
logical reasoning), deployed entirely on legal texts and problems, seemed adequate
equipment for a law professor." Id. at 9-10. In the legal-managerial framework or a
managerial analysis with law, legal-analytical methods find information, examine
circumstances, support consistent thinking, and deliver and use information in the
process of decision-making. The most basic legal-analytical methods include the
following: situational/factual analysis, issue/question recognition, gathering/finding
information, consistent/continuous thinking and applying/using law.
The article also discusses the existence, utility and power of using business
theories and principles to evaluate the impact of law and public policy on business
methodology and thinking and to entry by delivery and use of legal-managerial (L-M)
analysis with legal information in the process of decision-making. The legal-
managerial framework ascertains how ERISA and its analysis and information affect
business methodology and thinking that includes both business decision-making and
principles.
4. "Decision making is the process of generating and evaluating alternatives and
making choices among them.... See R. Wayne Moody et al., MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS
AND FUNCTIONS 6-7 (3d ed. 1986) (Hereinafter MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS). The classical
decision-making model relies on logic and rational thinking, elimination of
uncertainty and complete information. Ricky W. Griffin, MANAGEMENT 269 (6th ed.
1999). Griffin lists six steps in the classical model for decision-making. First,
recognizing and defining the decision situation includes "the need to define precisely
what the problem is. The manager must develop a complete understanding of the
problem, its causes, and its relationship to other factors." Id. at 270. Second,
identifying alternatives involves identifying alternative courses of effective action,"
including "obvious, standard alternatives and creative, innovative alternatives .. " Id.
at 271. Third, evaluating alternatives involves an evaluation of each alternative "in
terms of its feasibility, its satisfactoriness, and its consequences." Id. at 272. Fourth,
selecting the best alternative is generally "choos[ing] the alternative with the highest
combined level of feasibility, satisfactoriness and affordable consequences." Id. at 273.
Fifth, implementing the chosen alternative "is simply putting it in effect." Id. "When
they are implementing decisions, managers must also consider people's resistance to
change" and other potential resistance. Id. Sixth, following up and evaluating results
"requires the managers to evaluate the effectiveness of their decisions-that is, they
should make sure that the chosen alternative has served its original purpose." Id. at
274. Griffin notes that a "[flailure to evaluate decision effectiveness may have serious
13
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methodology. Each step of the decision-making process varies in its
informational and analytical needs and thus statistical, economic,
financial and other analytical methodologies provide analysis and
information to fit a particular need of a step within the decision-mak-
ing process.5 Should law be any different? The delivery of legal advice
that includes legal analysis and information should not be any less
precise than the delivery of financial, statistical or economic analysis
and information to the process of managerial analysis. Any impreci-
sion in the delivery of law that includes analysis and information
dooms many decisions to failure as irrational management thinking.
But lawyers still argue that those decisions are rational. We do not
generally educate lawyers to make business decisions. Likewise, we do
not educate managers to make legal conclusions, but we must educate
both lawyers and managers to understand the analytical and informa-
tional nature of legal and management methodologies for decision-
making. Educating managers takes place in schools and colleges of
business.
Lawyers are not students of managerial analysis, and managers
are not students of legal analysis. In educating managers, a need exists
for a legal-managerial framework that integrates legal and business
analyses and thinking. Meeting this need is long past due. The pro-
cess of business decision-making is a conduit for all other disciplines'
analysis and information, including law and public policy. The poten-
tial for disputes, conflicts and grayness among these analyses and
consequences." Id. Griffin recommends that "[w]henever possible managers should
strive to apply rationality and logic to the decisions they make." Id. at 274. He also
observes that American business organizations use rational decision-making 20% of
the time. Id. See also supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
managerial analysis to control and manipulate the process of business decision-
making). For another different list and explanation of the steps in the process of
business decision-making, see Earnest R. Archer, How To Make a Business Decision: An
Analysis of Theory and Practice, MANAGEMENT REVIEW 54-61 (1990) (business decision-
making process consists of nine steps.).
Other legal scholars in studying and teaching business law recognize that "[1]aw
and business decision-making are intimately related." See also John Collins, Learning
to Make Business Decisions in the Shadow of the Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. ED. 117, 118
(1999) (citing John Allison, The Role of Law in the Business School Curriculum, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. ED. 239 (1991)); Debra Dobray & David Steinman, The Application of
Case Method Teaching to Graduate Business Law Courses, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. ED. 81, 86
(1993)).
5. Schellenberger, supra note 1, at 14. Professor Schellenberger finds that
"[clertain analytical tools such as operations research, management science, statistical
analysis, economic analysis, econometrics, systems analysis, and others are used as
approaches to managerial analysis." Id.
[Vol. 24:131
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information as they enter the decision-making process demands a
legal-managerial framework. In the absence of such a framework, law-
yers and managers do not and shall never understand the relationship
between law and business within the decision-making process and
business thinking. Therefore the introduction and use of analysis and
legal information in the process of business decision-making are
uncertain and problematic. They are a source of disputes when man-
agers cannot grasp changes in situations or environments that affect
the use of recent legal advice. Legal and policy environments, business
interests and organizational objectives affect the use of L-M analysis
and legal information in the decision situation and other steps of deci-
sion-making. These environments, interests and objectives cause
changes in old situations and create new situations that justify the pre-
cise delivery and use of L-M analysis and legal information of a legal-
managerial framework.
The legal-managerial framework studies and explains how law
and management interact in the decision-making process and business
thinking. ERISA demonstrates the utility, necessity and validity of a
legal-managerial framework in understanding the impact of analysis
and legal information on the process of decision-making. ERISA
involves labor markets, financial markets and business functions.
ERISA also broadly involves public policy that includes social, eco-
nomic and political influences. The impact of ERISA on the process of
decision-making requires an understanding of business functions, eco-
nomics, regulation, common law and public policy. The breadth of the
impact of ERISA points out the need to weigh more precisely the
impact of law and public policy on the decision and the impact of the
decision on law and public policy.
Presently, legal information that includes common law, public
policy and legislation do not enter the process of decision-making
through any analytical tools of any legal-managerial framework. Legal
advice that includes legal analysis and information is not self-execut-
ing unless managers do nothing other than blindly follow precedents
that may be totally outdated for current business practices. Yet man-
agement would not be very innovative. Consequently, the delivery and
use of legal analysis and legal information to effect the decision situa-
tion, ultimate outcome and potential consequences have always been
unsystematic or untidy. This lack of an analytical framework increases
the likelihood that L-M analysis and legal information are not precisely
delivered to and concisely used by managers in the decision-making
process. Simply put, the means of integrating law and management
may be overly dependent on lawyerly skills and not on legal-analytic
20021
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methodology underpinning these skills. A managerial analysis with
law offers a L-M analysis and legal information for business decision-
making and represents analytical and informational needs of manage-
ment practitioners by insuring obedience to the law, conformity to
public policy, the ability to improve organizational effectiveness, and
the innovative use of managerial discretion and judgment.
B. The Purpose of an Integration of Legal and Management
Methodologies
This article explains how law and social policy affects managerial
discretion by limiting the alternatives of the process of decision-mak-
ing, affecting the implementation of the decision and demanding a
watchful eye on the policy consequences of business decisions.
Inserting ERISA analysis and information precisely into the process of
decision-making illustrates the impact of financial, labor and other
analyses and information. Labor and financial markets greatly affect
employee benefits plans governed by ERISA. First, inserting ERISA
analysis and information precisely into the decision-making process
shows the impact of business decisions on public policy that drives the
making of social and economic regulation. Second, inserting ERISA
analysis and information helps to ascertain the effect of law and public
policy on business objectives and interests that are implemented
through business decision-making. Third, using ERISA analysis and
information in a legal-managerial framework evaluates law and public
policy by using business concepts and thinking, such as finance and
management theories and principles. A legal-managerial framework
scrutinizes the making of plan decisions under ERISA analysis and
information throughout the process of decision-making. In fact, this
framework is a practical mechanism to determine whether benefit plan
decisions that are subject to financial, managerial and other business
concepts are either unlawful or lawful, including gray area decisions.
A legal-managerial framework combines legal and managerial
methodologies within the process of managerial analysis for business
decision-making. This framework uses and delivers L-M analysis and
legal information to the process of decision-making that concurrently
accepts delivery and then uses business, economic and other analyses
and information. As stated above, this legal-managerial framework is a
managerial analysis with law. The necessity, utility and validity of
managerial analysis with law for business decision-making rest on sev-
eral analytical and informational recognitions of legal and manage-
ment methodologies underlying the interdisciplinary use and delivery
of L-M analysis and legal information. First, a managerial analysis
[Vol. 24:131
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with law recognizes that business decisions should rest on rational
business theories, principles and concepts to support their findings,
outcomes, implementation and consequences. Second, a managerial
analysis with law recognizes that business decisions should further
established goals and objectives of the organization. Third, a manage-
rial analysis with law recognizes that legal analysis and information
affect the business situation, influence various inputs, restrict busi-
ness outcomes and affect the policy consequences of business deci-
sion-making. Fourth, a managerial analysis with law recognizes that
the use and delivery of legal analysis and information to the process of
business involve compliance, negotiation or litigation or combinations
thereof. Fifth, a managerial analysis with law recognizes that the deliv-
ery and use of analysis and legal information take place in two types of
business decision-making. One type of decision-making is compliance
decision-making, to comply with law and public policy. It brings com-
pany objectives, strategies and policies into compliance with law and
public policy. The other type is general decision-making to further
business and economic objectives. General decision-making imple-
ments company objectives, strategies and policies solely for business
purposes, such as survival and profits. It requires the use and delivery
of analysis and legal information to ascertain whether business and
other analyses and information of any step of the process of business
decision-making do not purposefully create too great a risk or liability
under law or public policy. Consequently, a managerial analysis with
the law evaluates and then introduces and uses legal analysis and
information in the form of a L-M analysis accompanying legal informa-
tion or advice that can be more precisely used in the process of busi-
ness decision-making.
Do not misunderstand me. Lawyers are not using faulty analysis
and giving bad advice, and managers are not ignoring legal advice or
not using legal information, in many instances. But, studying how
and when managers enter and use legal advice in the process of deci-
sion-making is still necessary. The systematic study of when, where
and how managers enter and use legal advice in the process of deci-
sion-making actually increases the effectiveness of business decision-
making with law and public policy. Using legal advice that includes
inappropriate analysis with legal information at the wrong place and
time in the process of decision-making may adversely affect decision
results on the objectives and goals of management. It would be disas-
trous for a manager to draw a conclusion when he or she should be
defining the issue or problem. In jurisprudence, legal thinking does
not accept such inconsistent or uncoordinated decision-making by
20021 147
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courts. To illustrate, a judge finds the issue and establishes a ratio-
nale, but the nature of the specific analysis and information of the
issue and rationale would not be identical or similar. Apparently, the
analysis in formulating an issue is not the same as the deductive rea-
soning in the rationale. Applying this same thinking to business deci-
sion-making means that the use of legal analysis and information
across the steps of the business decision-making process would be dif-
ferent in the nature and level of discipline-specific analysis and infor-
mation. There is the likelihood that when analysis and information
that effects the first step of the process of business decision-making are
used solely to effect the final step, this analysis and information may
be imprecisely delivered and inconsistently used throughout the pro-
cess of decision-making. For example, the follow-up to a decision
implemented in the present regulatory and company environments is
not always identical to the definition of the decision situation
examined in a past regulatory and company environments.6 Yet the
law and public policy apply to all environments. Therefore, the routine
use of the same analysis and information at the end and beginning of
the process of decision-making is just too imprecise and inexact, espe-
cially in the dynamic business environments of technologically
advanced domestic and foreign economies. Simply, we need a legal-
managerial framework.
C. The Nature of an Integration of Legal and Management
Methodologies
Legal analytic methodology uses legal analysis concisely and
delivers legal information precisely across the thought-process ofjudicial
and other legal thinking that is not methodologically identical from begin-
ning to end. Likewise, the analytical and informational requirements
and needs of the steps of the process of business decision-making are
not methodologically identical in management thinking.7 Yet we
assume that if lawyers use good legal analysis and give good legal
information, managers will use this analysis and information properly
and thus avoid intentional or unintentional violations of civil and
criminal law in the process of business decision-making. In practice,
this assumption is often proven false by disputes. There is no legal-
6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7. See Charles R. Schwenk, THE ESSENCE OF STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 13-34
(1988). See also Appendix A (Appendix A describes the structural similarities between
legal-analytical methodology and management methodology. It also describes how the
most basic legal methodology can deliver and use legal analysis and information in
management methodology for decision-making.).
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managerial framework to eliminate such an assumption. In pedagogy
and practice, a managerial analysis with law must use and deliver anal-
ysis and legal information, which, in turn, provides conclusions, find-
ings and observations at the right place and at the right time in the
business decision-making process. In pedagogy and theory, a manage-
rial analysis with law uses managerial and other business theories to
evaluate the (pre-decisional) impact of law and public policy on busi-
ness thinking. Therefore a managerial analysis with law includes the
entry of law and public policy into the process of decision-making and
an evaluation of the impact of law and public policy on business meth-
odology and thinking.
The methodological underpinning of the legal-managerial frame-
work matches informational and analytical needs of the process of
business decision-making with legal-analytical methods and their find-
ings and thinking. This framework thus provides information and
analysis consistent with the managerial needs of the decision situation
and other steps of the process of decision-making. This framework
also weighs the impact of the business decision on public policy that
eventually leads to new regulation to effect managerial discretion.8
The effects of illegal practices, unlawful decisions and policy errors by
management illustrate the need for and utility of a legal-managerial
framework that would help managers routinely use the analysis and
information of law and public policy in the business decision-making
process. In entering law and public policy in the decision-making pro-
cess, the framework offers a precise insertion of law and public policy
through legal-analytical methods that deliver and use unbundled legal
analysis with legal information in the decision-making process to form
a L-M analysis.
This article uses ERISA analysis and information to outline the
utility, validity and necessity of using a legal-managerial framework in
the process of business decision-making. This process of decision-
making relies on law and other discipline-specific approaches that pro-
vide analyses and information of law and other methodologies, such as
finance, economic and statistics. In our example of the legal-manage-
rial framework, ERISA is law and public policy that includes both anal-
ysis and information of a broad, complex regulation.9 ERISA analysis
and information include fields of regulation, common law and public
policy. 10 Management cannot ignore ERISA analysis and information
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980).
10. See infra notes 25-78 and accompanying text.
20021
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in making business decisions that affect the management1 and admin-
istration1 2 of employee benefit plans,' 3 including pension 14 and wel-
fare.15 On one hand, ERISA affects plan administration that includes
11. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
12. Companies that establish employee benefit plans may play three roles in the
operation of these plans. See Musto v. American General Corp., 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir.
1988). These roles may create a potential conflict of interest. See id. at 910. In Musto,
the court of appeals observed that the company could play three different roles in
maintaining an employee benefit plan. First, the company plays its traditional role as
employer that manages such plans to further its business interests. Second, the
company may be the plan administrator that administers the plan solely for the benefit
of employees under fiduciary obligations. Third, the company may be an insurance
carrier that implements the employee benefits plan in accordance with state insurance
regulation. Id. The potential conflict of interest arises when the company is both plan
administrator and plan manager or employer. When the employer is acting as the plan
administrator, the employer is subject to fiduciary standards under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(A)(1) and thus must administer the plan on behalf of retirees, employees and
their spouses and dependents. Id. at 911. In Musto, the court of appeals succinctly
describes the crux of the manager-administrator conflict in stating that "[tihere is a
world of difference between administering a welfare plan in accordance with its terms
and deciding what those terms are to be. A company acts as a fiduciary in performing
the first task, but not the second." Id. Management establishes and later modifies or
terminates the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans. See id.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). ERISA defines an employee
benefit plan as follows:
"The term "employee benefit plan" or "plan" means an employee welfare
benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an
employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan."
Id.
14. Id. at § 1002(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). ERISA defines an employee
pension benefit plan as follows:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms "employee pension benefit
plan" and "pension plan" mean any plan, fund, or program which was
heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an
employee organization, or both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a
result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to
the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the
method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of
calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing
benefits from the plan.
Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2 (2002) (Federal regulations define and list employee
compensation and benefits that are employee pension benefits.).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). ERISA defines an employee
welfare benefit plan as follows:
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan,
fund, or program which has heretofore or is hereafter established or
150
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fiduciary and other actions in the administration of the terms and con-
ditions of benefits plan on behalf of the plan participants.16 On the
other hand, ERISA affects plan management that includes business
decisions to establish, modify or eliminate the terms and conditions of
benefits plans on behalf of the company for business interests. 17
ERISA permits employees and retirees to protect their rights and obli-
gations under the terms and conditions of employee benefits plans.',
Retirees and employees frequently file ERISA claims to challenge deci-
sions of plan administrators and plan managers in providing and man-
aging, respectively, pension benefits and welfare benefits plans.' 9
ERISA analysis and information affect business decision-making
for plan administration and management that responds directly to bus-
iness interests, organizational objectives and market demands.2 ° A
managerial analysis with law that is heavily or entirely dependent on
ERISA analysis and information shows the nature of restraints
imposed on managerial discretion 2 ' and judgment in the process of
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or both, to the
extent that such plan, fund or program was established or is maintained for
the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through
the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other
training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other
than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such
pensions).
Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1 (2002)(Federal regulations define and list employee
compensation and benefits that are employee welfare benefits.).
16. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
21. See Donald C. Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, Managerial Discretion: A Bridge
Between Polar Views of Organizational Outcomes, in RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR: AN ANNUAL SERIES OF ANALYTICAL ESSAYS AND CRITICAL REvIEWs 371 (L. L.
Cummings & Barry M. Straw eds., 1987). Hambrick and Finkelstein define
managerial discretion as the "latitude of managerial action." Id. "Managerial action is
domains that executives operate in ...." Id. at 370. Most importantly, these domains
include "resource allocation and administrative choices (e.g., reward systems and
structure) and staffing." Id. at 371. Managerial discretion exists in the management
and administration of employee benefit plans. See McNab v. General Motors Corp.,
162 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 1998). In McNab, Judge Easterbrook, writing for majority,
states that:
There's nothing wrong under ERISA with a system that gives plan
administrators discretion. Subject to a few explicit rules in the statute, an
21
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decision-making for the management of employee benefits plans.22
The process of managerial analysis also includes financial, statistical,
economic and other analytical approaches to deliver and use analyses
and information throughout the process of business decision-making.
A managerial analysis with law or the legal-managerial framework inte-
grates ERISA and other managerial analyses and information into the
process of decision-making that plan managers and corporate execu-
tives use to make decisions. A managerial analysis with ERISA affects
the use and delivery of ERISA analysis and information to the decision-
making process, while concurrently using financial, accounting, eco-
nomic and other analytical approaches to produce more particular
findings and thinking.23
III. THE NATURE OF ERISA ANALYSIS IN BuSINEss DECISION-MAKING
There would be no need for a legal-managerial framework or a
managerial analysis with law if legal analysis and information did not
affect business subject matter, or the methodology and thinking that
eventually enters the process of business decision-making.24 ERISA
demonstrates the necessity of such a framework by its effect on busi-
ness subject matter, methodology and thinking. This framework rec-
ognizes and examines the interaction of political, economic and social
conditions that cause organizations to modify, terminate or amend
employee benefits plans, which also drive changes in public policy and
regulation. Managerial analysis with law is sensitive to other manage-
rial analyses that include business, social science, mathematical and
other analytical approaches. These approaches of managerial analysis
in general produce discipline-specific analyses and information for the
employer may design a pension or welfare plan with features of its choosing,
provided it is willing to pay the cost. (citations omitted) Plaintiffs concede
that GM is entitled to adopt an early-retirement plan under which the
eligibility standard is the best interests of GM, as GM's board of directors sees
those interests. This is exactly what GM did, having put up the extra money
necessary to pay for the benefits. If it is unlawful to adopt a plan that gives
discretion to senior managers, it must be lawful to use that discretion to
evaluate what the "best interests" of a firm are.
Id at 961-62. McNab is a clear indication that regulation reduces managerial
discretion and that the exercise of managerial discretion through decision-making
furthers corporate objectives. Moreover the broad managerial discretion provided by
ERISA is consistent with its purpose and structure. See infra note 79.
22. See James E. Holloway & Douglas K Schneider, ERISA, FASB and Benefit Plan
Amendments: A Section 402(b)(3) Violation As a Loss Contingency for a Plan
Amendment, 46 Drake L. Rev. 97, 148 (1997).
23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 61, 67 and accompanying text.
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process of decision-making. This analysis and information can affect
each step in the process of decision-making differently and thus
require the delivery and use of a particular L-M analysis to accompany
legal information in each step of the decision-making process.
This legal-managerial framework ascertains, examines and weighs
the impact of ERISA analysis and information on plan decisions of
managers and the impact of plan decisions on ERISA and other poli-
cies. The framework considers how economic, social science and
other analyses affect the delivery and use of ERISA analysis and infor-
mation within the decision-making process. The framework recog-
nizes the need for consistency between business decisions and
business concepts as well as consistency with company objectives.
The managerial analysis with law relies on managerial, financial and
other discipline-specific principles and theories to establish grounds
for plan decisions that must further rational company objectives and
be justified by the actual decision situation.
A. The Role of ERISA Analysis and Information in Decision-Making
ERISA is the regulation of plan administration and management
that involves accounting, finance, management and other business
functions and that affects both the subject matter of decisions and the
process of making decisions. These functions play essential roles in
plan management and administration that includes establishing, modi-
fying and terminating employee benefit plans. ERISA protects
employee welfare and pension benefit plans of employee and retirees
from abuse by employers and plan administrators.25 ERISA governs
pension benefit plans26 and welfare benefit plans.27 Welfare benefits
include severance benefits28 and health care benefits. 29 ERISA broadly
regulates employee benefit plans by mandating technical or procedural
requirements for reporting and disclosure,30 participation and vest-
ing3' and fiduciary responsibilities. 32  These provisions govern
employee pension benefit plans more stringently than welfare benefit
plans.33 Fiduciary responsibility requirements govern both pension
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
26. Id. at § 1002(2)(A).
27. Id. at § 1002(1).
28. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 111-13 (1989).
29. Curtis-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 77-78 (1995).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
31. Id. at §§ 1081-1086.
32. Id. at §§ 1101-1104.
33. See Adams v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990).
20021
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and welfare benefit plans.34 Moreover, reporting and disclosure
requirements govern both pension and welfare benefit plans.35 Con-
gress excluded welfare benefit plans from the coverage of participation
and vesting36 and funding37 provisions of ERISA.38 ERISA changes the
way managers managed and administered benefits plans under the
common law and thus affects business functions, subject matters and
methodology.
ERISA establishes fundamental standards and requirements for
the regulation of employee benefits plans. It does not require employ-
ers to grant employee welfare or pension benefits. 39 ERISA does not
govern the substantive contents of employee benefit plans.40 It man-
dates guidelines for the administration of employee benefit plans,4 1
such as requiring plans to be written. 42 The ERISA regulatory frame-
work provides beneficiaries and plan participants protection that had
not been provided by federal and state law, but increases the regula-
tion of employee benefit plans.43 Plan participants and beneficiaries
can file claims for a wrongful denial, unlawful termination or improper
modification of pension and welfare benefits under section 502(a) 44 of
ERISA.45 Section 502(a), in part, seeks "to enforce... [an employee's]
rights under the terms of . . . [the] plan, [and] to clarify . . . [the
employee's] rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."46
ERISA also creates unique claims that are distinct from common law
claims.47 ERISA provisions establish claims for failing to comply with
reporting and disclosure requirements,48 failing to include terms to
34. See Spink v. Lockheed, 517 U.S. 882 (1996); Adams, 905 F.2d at 947.
35. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 81-83; Adams, 905 F.2d at 947.
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
37. Id. at §§ 1081-1086.
38. See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 77-78.
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
40. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
42. Id. at § 1102(a).
43. Id. at § 1001. See infra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
45. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
47. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The reporting and dis-
closure requirements affect decisional methodologies that include principles and
processes for determining, implementing and following up on decisional outcomes.
See supra notes 4, 7 and accompanying text. ERISA's reporting and disclosure
requirements affect the identity of the decision-makers and the distribution of
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modify or terminate plans,4 9 and failing to conform to fiduciary stan-
dards in the administration of benefit plans. 50 As federal courts hear
and review these unique ERISA claims, they apply ERISA and supple-
ment it with the federal common law of contracts, trusts and corpora-
tions.51 ERISA protects employee benefits plans, but it imposes greater
managerial restraints on managing and administering employee bene-
fits plans.
Although ERISA analysis and information limit both managerial
discretion and judgment in plan administration and management,
Congress clearly wanted federal courts to rethink the analysis and
rules of common law. Section 514(a)52 is the ERISA preemption provi-
sion that implicitly includes the mandate for federal courts to develop
federal common law of contracts, trusts and corporations to supple-
ment ERISA."3 The Court has consistently held that Congress
intended for ERISA preemption to be broad and expansive in address-
ing conflict between ERISA and state law.54 Section 514(a) states that
ERISA "shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ....- 5 The Court
decisions. See infra notes 193-275 and accompanying text. Here ERISA obligations
control the beginning and ending of the decision-making process by requiring the
company to delegate authority with specificity before decision-making begins and to
make a full disclosure of a decision at a specific time before or at implementation.
Other ERISA obligations impose obligations for plan termination, modification,
funding, fiduciary standards and participation. See supra notes 25-38 and
accompanying text. This ERISA subject matter or legal information primarily affects
the inputs entering the process. Such inputs or information affects one or more steps
of the decision-making process, and each step may require different analysis and
information. See infra notes 4, 7 and accompanying text. See also Appendix A
(illustrating the compatibility of legal-analytical and managerial methodologies).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
50. Id. at §§ 1101-1114.
51. See infra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
53. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Burch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-12 (1989) (citing
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983). In Franchise Tax Board, the
Court states that "'A body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts
to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension
plans."' Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 24 n.26 (quoting 129 Cong. Rec. 29942
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
54. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981); Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985); Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987);
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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concluded that a broad preemption furthers the intent of Congress by
establishing uniform and consistent federal law to regulate employee
benefit plans.56 Thus ERISA invalidates state law and public policy
and limits the impact of state common law under ERISA analysis and
information. Other federal and state public policies still abound.
B. Policy Interests Affecting the Role of ERISA in Decision-Making
Under a managerial analysis with law, ERISA analysis and infor-
mation affect plan decisions that must consider public policy con-
cerns regarding social welfare, retirement security and health care. A
legal-managerial framework must deliver policy information and
address policy concerns closely related to the law, such as ERISA and
retirement security. Plan and business decisions respond to changes
in labor, financial, health care and other markets and thus cannot
ignore public policy that may end in regulation of business. Business
decisions include plan amendments, terminations and modifications
that can impose personal and social hardships on retirees and employ-
ees. When these benefits are lost, employees often challenge plan
decisions to modify, amend and terminate plans.57 Companies termi-
nate or modify plans when financial or other circumstances create eco-
nomic or financial hardships. 58 Companies also amend benefit plans
by clarifying and adding terms to identify events that would automati-
cally terminate or modify plans.59 Courts scrutinize plan decisions to
address issues involved in the making and implementing plan amend-
ments and modifications. For example, retirees have requested a fed-
eral court to determine whether a company had established a
procedure to identify the person who could make decisions to amend a
benefits plan. The Supreme Court found that this company had estab-
lished a procedure, but it could not determine if the company had fol-
lowed this procedure.6 ° Under a legal managerial framework, legal
challenges to business decisions, such as plan terminations, amend-
ments and modifications, raise public policy concerns for plan man-
agers and administrators because they may eventually lead to
56. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U. S. at 732.
57. See generally infra note 70 and accompanying text (listing commentary on plan
terminations and their effects under ERISA).
58. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
59. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 75-76.
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Section 1102(b)(3) states
that "[elvery employee benefit plan shall ... provide a procedure for amending such
plan, and for identifying the persons who have authority to amend the plan." Id.
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regulation and affect the implementation and follow-up to business
(plan) decisions.
ERISA analysis and information includes public policy and its
impact on the process of decision-making and thus creates the need to
scrutinize institutional and organizational means-ends relationships,
such as the regulation-objective and decision-objective fits, respec-
tively. Social factors and economic conditions influence business deci-
sions to amend, modify or terminate benefit plans 6' and thus raise
policy concerns regarding employee welfare and retirement security.
Plan decisions directly affect retirees, employees and their families who
believed that pension and welfare benefits were certain and then found
that these benefits could be terminated or modified by their former
employers without their consent.62 Employees eventually learned that
an employer's decision to establish a benefit plan did not create retire-
ment or other security. These benefits were merely gratuities of pros-
perous economic conditions and stable social conditions. In addition,
creditors, investors and others also want a certain and stable financial
performance. Establishing irrevocable employee benefits, such as pen-
sion and health care, could greatly affect profitability by limiting com-
pany responses to financial and other markets affecting growth in
profits and financial equity. Public and private rethinking of employee
benefit needs and liabilities results from changes in social, economic
and business conditions 63 and thus drives decision-making in plan
management and affects the relationships between public need-busi-
ness interest and business decision-company objective.
Several factors create the need for companies to scrutinize the
institutional fit or relationship between public needs and business
interests. Social, economic or business conditions create the business
need to amend, terminate or modify benefits plans. First, demo-
graphic trends indicate increasing numbers of and longer life expec-
61. See D. L. Salisbury, Foreword in RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: WHAT IS THE PROMISE?
xiii (Employee Benefit Research Institute ed. 1989) (Hereinafter cited as Salisbury-
EBRI); D. L. Glifford and C. A. Seltz, FUNDAMENTALS OF FLEXIBLE COMPENSATION 6-7
(1988); A. C. Enthoven, Retiree Health Benefits as a Public Policy Issue, in RETIREE
HEALTH BENEFITS: WHAT IS THE PROMISE? 3-5 (Employee Benefit Research Institute ed.
1989) (Hereinafter cited as Enthoven-EBRI).
62. See generally infra note 70 and accompanying text (listing commentary on plan
terminations and their effects under ERISA).
63. See e.g., John Thatcher McNeil, The Failure of Free Contract in the Context of
Employer-Sponsored Retiree Welfare Benefits: Moving Towards a Solution, 25 Harv. J. on
Legis. 213, 214 (1988); McMahon, Labor-Management Health Care Cost Containment:
Present and Future Challenges to Cooperative Problem Solving, Employee Benefits
Journal, June 1987, at 14.
1572002]
27
Holloway: The Practical Entry and Utility of a Legal-Managerial Framework w
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
tancy for older Americans in the workforce.6" The aging of the
population creates a greater need for health care and other benefits.
Second, federal policy-makers are reluctant to enact a national health
care program to address inadequate health care. It is doubtful whether
the federal government wants to assume employers' responsibilities for
providing medical care to employees and retirees.65 Third, many
employers are paying for retiree and employee health care expenses
while health care costs are still increasing.66 Many employers do not
have pre-funded welfare benefit plans. Instead, most welfare benefit
plans are created on a pay-as-you-go basis.67 Fourth, the Financial
Standards Accounting Board (FASB) requires many companies to
accrue plan expenses and accumulate liabilities of postretirement ben-
efits plans to prevent plan costs and liabilities from undermining inves-
tor and market confidence.68 Companies must now report accrued
expenses on the income statement, accumulated liabilities on the bal-
ance sheet and disclose benefit-related financial information.69 Social
conditions, public policy concerns and financial disclosures increase
the risks of granting pension and welfare benefits and thus create the
need for the precise delivery and use of public policy analysis and
information regarding ERISA and its purposes in business planning
and decision-making. A managerial analysis with law is sensitive to
64. See C. J. Loomis, The Killer Cost Stalking Business, Fortune, Feb. 27, 1989, at
61; McNeil, supra note 63, at 219.
65. Retiree Medical Coverage Poses Multiple Liabilities, Employee Benefit Plan
Review, Oct. 1987, at 34, 35 (Hereinafter cited as Retiree Medical Coverage); Jane
Bryant Quinn, Financing Long-Term Care, The Choice: Better Insurance or More Taxes,
Newsweek, Jan. 30, 1989, at 52.
66. See Meg Delaney, Who Will Pay for Retiree Health Care?, Personnel Journal, Mar.
1987, at 83; D. L. Salisbury, A Rude Awakening On Retiree Health Benefits, Across the
Board, Oct. 1987, at 8; M. Beck et al., You Afford to Get Sick, Newsweek, Jan. 30, 1989,
at 45; F. Luthans & E. Davis, The Healthcare Cost Crisis: Causes and Containment,
Personnel, Feb. 1990, at 24; Retiree Medical Benefits Costs' Keep Rising, Employee
Benefit Plan Rev., Sept. 1990, at 10, 10-13; Health Care Costs Threaten Future Retirees,
Employee Benefit Plan Rev., Feb. 1992, at 45, 45-46.
67. See e.g., FASB, ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS: ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AS OF JUNE
1, 1991, VOL. 1, 1993/94 ED., FASB STATEMENTS OF STANDARDS, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 106: Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other
Than Pensions, 1273, 1278, June 1991 (Hereinafter cited as FASB Standard No. 106).
For the implications of FASB Standard No. 106 on plan terminations and
modifications, see generally Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Broken Promises: Implementation of
Financial Accounting Standards Board Rule 106, ERISA, and Legal Challenges to
Modification and Termination of Postretirement Health Care Benefit Plans, 68 St. John's
L. Rev. 427 (1994).
68. FASB Standard No. 106, supra note 67, at 1278.
69. Id.
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institutional relationships involving public policy and regulation and
thus makes managers aware of the need to consider the impact of their
actions on public policy.
Economics and finance enter the analyses and information
through discipline-specific approaches that also affect the organiza-
tional relationship between a business decision and company objec-
tives. Plan benefit costs and liabilities reduce profits and slow growth,
leading managers to make unilateral thanges to pension and welfare
benefit plans. Few managers discontinue welfare benefit plans, but
many managers modify their health care benefit plans by instituting
managed care, imposing caps on benefits and imposing copayment
requirements.70  These measures shift greater risk to retirees and
employees. Indeed, these measures require retirees and employees to
assume financial responsibilities for the cost of health care and other
benefits.71 Those retirees who are not eligible for Medicare 72 and
Medicaid 73 must pay the full cost of medical care7 4 if they are not
70. See Gregory J. Ossi, Note, It Doesn't Add Up: The Broken Promises of Lifetime
Health Benefits, Medicare, and Accounting Rule FAS 106 Do Not Equal Satisfactory
Medical Coverage for Retirees, 13J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 233 (1996); Ford, supra
note 67; McNeil, supra note 63; Leonard R. Page, Retiree Insurance Benefits: Enforcing
Employer Obligations, 38 Lab. L. J. 496 (1987); K. H. Goeppinger, Postemployment
Welfare Benefit Plans: An Emerging Priority of the 80's, Employee Benefits J., 32 (Mar.
1987); Joan Vogel, Until Death Do Us Part: Vesting of Retiree Insurance, 9 Indus. Rel.
L.R. 183 (1987).
"Vested benefits are defined as those which an employer has a contractual or
statutory obligation to provide." McNeil, supra note 63, at 223 n.65. Vested benefits
are for the lifetime of the retiree. Id. Commentators, analysts and judges wrestled
during the 1980's and 1990's with the issue of terminating and modifying welfare
benefits under ERISA. See e.g., McNeil, supra note 63, at 214-15 nn.10-17; Vogel, supra
note 70, at 184 nn.3-4. Vogel, McNeil, and others suggest that Congress should amend
ERISA or enact other legislation to partially or fully vest or protect welfare benefits.
71. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
72. Health Insurance for the Aged, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 100 et seq., 79 Stat. 290
(1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 88 1395-1395 11, and in scattered parts of 26
U.S.C. and 45 U.S.C.). Eligibility for participation in Medicare is set forth under 42
U.S.C. 88 1395(c) and 1395(j). Medicare consists of two insurance programs: Part A -
Hospital Insurance Benefits for the Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c), and Part
B - Supplementing Medical Insurance Benefits for the Aged and Disabled. Id. at
§ 1395(j).
73. Grants to States for Medical Assistance Program, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 121 et
seq., 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1396(d)). Medicaid is a state
health care assistance program subsidized by the federal government. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396. It provides medical assistance for the poor, disabled, aged and minor
dependent children and their parents. See id. at § 1396. The states establish minimum
eligibility and medical service standards that must be consistent with federal
guidelines. Id. at § 1396(a).
29
Holloway: The Practical Entry and Utility of a Legal-Managerial Framework w
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
receiving health care benefits under a welfare benefits plan. Public
needs often cause changes in public policy that drives the need for
social and employment regulation. Consequently, a legal-managerial
framework that provides discipline-specific analysis and information
may be doomed if it does not consider the policy implications of busi-
ness plans and decisions that must anticipate and respond to public
interests. A managerial analysis with law includes consistency and
continuity between means and ends of organizational relationships
that must not further objectives by irrational and unlawful decisions,
and institutional relationships that must recognize business interests
in making lawful decisions.
C. An Interdisciplinary Approach to Decision-Making Using ERISA
ERISA analysis and information constrain managerial discretion
and judgment, which in turn affects the need for and use of financial,
labor and other resources in the management of benefit plans, in sev-
eral ways.75 First, ERISA analysis and information affect a particular
step in the process of business decision-making by imposing technical
procedures and obligations. ERISA can alter the definition of the deci-
sion situation, eliminate some decision alternatives, affect implementa-
tion of some decisions, or limit use of practices and other actions of
earlier decisions.76 ERISA constrains a plan amendment, termination
or modification with technical procedures and guidelines. ERISA
greatly limits the managerial discretion of common law and its think-
ing. Second, ERISA analysis and information do not include an evalua-
tion of management methodology and thinking before business
decision-making. A managerial analysis with law uses business theo-
ries and principles to ascertain the impact of ERISA analysis and infor-
mation on management methodology and thinking. This evaluation
produces analysis and information that may enter the process of busi-
ness decision-making with L-M analysis and legal information. Third,
business theories and principles should underlie any business deci-
sion and provide a logical or rational basis for a decision and its impli-
cations. Profitability and cost reduction are quintessential business
concepts. Other business principles, such as employee security or
organizational flexibility, provide the grounds for many business deci-
sions and thus must be included along with law and public policy in
the process of business decision-making. In the process of managerial
74. See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
76. See infra notes 148-276 and accompanying text.
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analysis, a legal-managerial framework integrates legal analysis and
management methodology to form L-M analysis to accompany legal
information that must be usable by managers and executives on entry
into the process of business decision-making.
The legal-managerial framework that employs this interdiscipli-
nary or combined analysis and methodology more precisely examines
business situations that require consideration of law and public policy
in the context of business decision-making. Business decisions and
acts may violate civil and criminal law and thus may impose litigation
costs, disruptive effects and negative publicity on business organiza-
tions. These negative consequences justify the need for a legal-mana-
gerial framework that is interdisciplinary in methodology and
thinking. Just adding law and using business intuition in business
decision-making will not logically address the interaction of external
markets, environments and conditions.77 An analytical framework
that integrates law and management in the process of managerial anal-
ysis for decision-making provides more insight into business decisions,
management thinking and their consequences. For example, the
framework would examine and explain that a plan modification is an
at-will employment decision, but still is justified by management con-
cepts and thinking in the process of decision-making. ERISA abolishes
or diminishes many common law rules, but it still does not go far
enough for many individuals. Common law that permits business
decisions with few risks and liabilities does not promote a broad analy-
sis of decision situations and decisional consequences in business and
policy environments and economic markets. Common law thinking
does not necessarily cause an integration of law, finance, and other
business concepts and thinking on matters of employee welfare, orga-
nizational flexibility and cost management in making business deci-
sions, especially employee benefit plan decisions. A managerial
analysis with law must do so. Thus a managerial analysis with law
must apply ERISA analysis and information in business decision-mak-
ing to address the availability, amount and quality of welfare and pen-
sion benefits under accounting, financial, economic and other
approaches of a managerial analysis for business decision-making. 78
IV. EFFECTS OF ERISA ANALYSIS ON COMMON LAW DISCRETION
There is an extensive, if not continuing, erosion of managerial dis-
cretion in selecting among competing alternatives that are constantly
77. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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being diminished and eliminated through the impact of federal regula-
tion and its changes to state common law. Such losses give impetus to
a coherent or systematic delivery and use of law and its analysis and
information in the process of business decision-making. A managerial
analysis with law recognizes that state common law gave and still gives
greater managerial latitude in choosing among competing alternatives
of decision situations and implementing decisions in the legal and pol-
icy environments. ERISA alters this latitude only to implement federal
employee benefit policy, but uses common law where the federal law is
silent.79 ERISA imposes federal obligations on management to comply
with reporting and disclosure requirements.8 0 It requires plan manag-
ers to establish procedures to modify and terminate plans' and to
comply with fiduciary duties in the administration of plans., 2 Federal
courts apply only ERISA and supplement it with federal common law
on particular issues.8 3 ERISA's obligations exceed contract, trust and
other duties of state common law that previously governed employee
benefit plans. Therefore, ERISA analysis and information give less
managerial discretion to managers and administrators in the manage-
ment of employee benefits plans that were once governed by common
law.
79. See infra notes 148-276 and accompanying text. In Inter-Modal Rail Employees
Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510 (1997), the Court states
that:
The flexibility an employer enjoys to amend or eliminate its welfare plan is
not an accident; Congress recognized that "requiring the vesting of these
ancillary benefits would seriously complicate the administration and
increase the cost of plans." Giving employers this flexibility also encourages
them to offer more generous benefits at the outset, since they are free to
reduce benefits should economic conditions sour. If employers were locked
into the plans they initially offered, "they would err initially on the side of
omission." .
Id. at 515 (internal citations omitted). See also Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S.
882, 894 (1996) ("obtaining waivers of employment-related claims" does not offend
the policy of ERISA); K. A. Jensen & A. M. Kelly, The Impact of Lockheed: More
Flexibility for Employers in Pension Benefit Plans, 22 Emp. Rel. L. J. 25 (1996)
(commentary on the impact of Lockheed on organizational flexibility).
80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
81. Id. at § 1102(b)(3).
82. Id. at §§ 1101-1114. See also James E. Holloway, The ERISA Amendment
Provision as a Disclosure Function: Including Workable Termination Procedures in the
Functional Purpose of Section 402(b)(3), 46 Drake L. Rev. 755 (1998) (arguing that
plan terminations should not be subject to the same procedures applied to plan
amendments).
83. See infra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
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A. The Role of Common Law Thinking under ERISA and Its Policy
Congress limits the managerial discretion that existed under com-
mon law by expressly invalidating state common law and public pol-
icy pertaining to employee benefits plans. The ERISA preemption
provision states that ERISA shall "supersede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan. '8 4 The United States Supreme Court has held that "federal
courts are to develop a federal common law of rights and obligations
under ERISA-regulated plans." 5 Federal courts have developed federal
common law of contract and trusts to supplement ERISA. 6 This sup-
plemental law must be consistent with federal labor policy.8 7 In Alessi
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,"" the Court held that Congress intended
for ERISA preemption to be broad and expansive in the preemption of
state law.8 9 The Court concluded that a broad preemption furthers the
intent of Congress so that uniform and consistent federal substantive
law regulates employee benefit plans.9" Other federal labor policy is
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
85. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 56.
86. See e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Burch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-12 (1989)
(citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)). See also Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983).
87. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 112-15.
88. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
89. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 523; Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98; Metro. Life Insurance Co., 471
U.S. at 732; Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 47; Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 136. For
commentary on the preemption of state law and policy by ERISA, see, e.g., Peter H.
Turza & Lorraine Hollaway, Preemption of State Laws Under the Employee Retirement
Income Act of 1974, 28 Cath. U. L. Rev. 163 (1974); James D. Hutchinson & David M.
Ifshn, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23 (1978); Michael S. Ackerman, Note, ERISA:
Preemption of State Health Care Laws and Worker Well Being, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 825;
David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective
Federalism, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 427 (1987); Laura J. Bond, Note, ERISA-Preemption-
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux: Congress's Cue to Reassess ERISA's Preemptive Effect,
36 U. Kan. L. Rev. 611 (1988); Mary A. Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to
Increasing Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 255 (1990);
Robert I. Lorio, Note, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon: State Actions for Wrongful
Employment Discharge Subject to ERISA Preemption, 37 Loy. L. Rev. 375 (1991); James
E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health Care: A Call for
"Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States' Role in Formulating Health Care Policy,
16 Campbell L. Rev. 405 (1994).
90. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U. S. at 732. The Court has held that ERISA preempts
state legislation and common law. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of
Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992) (preempts District of Columbia Workers' Compensation
amendment that requires employers to continue and extend health care coverage);
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not as explicit regarding the preemption of state law. Section 301"1 of
the Labor Management Relations Act92 (LMRA) does not contain a pre-
emption provision, but the Court has held that federal substantive law
applies exclusively to breaches of collective bargaining agreements
("CBAs").93 Under Section 301(a),94 federal and state courts have con-
current jurisdiction.9 5 LMRA and ERISA are federal labor policies that
invalidate common law by not allowing states to effect the administra-
tion and management of employee benefit plans. Both of these Acts
abolish or diminish common law analysis and reasoning. Thus the
common law does not determine the level of managerial discretion or
judgment. ERISA does.
Although ERISA analysis and information exclusively regulate
employee benefit plans, ERISA does permit states to affect employee
benefit plans in providing for the welfare and security of employees
and retirees. State law can still affect health care policy through insur-
ance. ERISA exempts state regulation of insurance from preemption
and thus permits states to enact mandated-benefit regulation to pro-
vide particular health care benefits under group insurance plans.96
Moreover, federal social policies support retirement welfare and secur-
ity through medical insurance and assistance. Retirees older than 65
years of age are eligible for Medicare, a federally managed medical
insurance program.97 Coverage is not always available to early retirees
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (preempts state wrongful
discharge); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (preempts state anti-
suborgation law); Pilot-Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (preempts state
tort and contract law claims); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)
(preempts common law insurance claims); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 451
U.S. 504 (1981) (preempts provision of New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
92. Chap. 20, 61 Stat. 326 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187).
93. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957);
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouseman & Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747-48.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
95. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Boys Mkts., Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471
U.S. at 739-44. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the Court held that the ERISA
preemption provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), does not preempt mandated-benefit
regulation of insurance contracts that mandate that insurance companies provide
coverage for mental health illnesses. Id at 739-47. Such contracts are exempted from
preemption by the ERISA saving clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A), which exempts
insurance contracts from preemption under the ERISA preemption clause. Id. at 739-
44.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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who are less than 65 years of age. Retirees who are not eligible for
Medicare but receive low incomes and possess few assets may be eligi-
ble for Medicaid. Medicaid is a federally supported, state means-
tested, medical care assistance program that provides medical care and
related services to the needy.98 Medicaid does not cover retirees who
do not meet the requirements of its means test.99
ERISA regulates the management of employee benefit plans but
explicitly exempts the regulation of insurance by the states from its
preemption provision. 10
Federal courts have developed federal common law of contract to
supplement ERISA and other federal labor policy. 10 ' These courts cre-
ated federal rules of contract construction to ascertain the intent of
parties to CBAs where one or both parties raise an issue regarding
ambiguity of a CBA provision.' 0 2 Federal courts construe the terms
and conditions of employee benefit plans using at-will employment
contracts. 10 3 Federal common law trust principles also apply in adopt-
ing a standard of review for claims filed under section 502(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA.104 These courts must apply federal common law consistent
98. See id. at §§ 1396 et seq. Some early retirees, who are less than 65 years old,
may not have enough health care benefits and thus may need assistance under
Medicaid. See id. Medicaid provides medical assistance for millions of poor, low-
income, and other individuals. It provides medical assistance to "low-income elderly,
blind, disabled, pregnant, or those caring for minor dependent children." J. Dimeo,
Congress Restricts Medicaid Financing, Pension World, 23, 24 (une 1992).
99. See id. at § 1396. Many employees participate in early retirement programs,
usually choosing to retire before 65 years of age. ERISA and other regulatory
requirements must be considered in implementing early retirements of downsizing
and restructuring programs. See generally B. Seibert, Downsizing: An Overview of Legal
Consideration, 43 Lab. L. J. 483, 483-487 (1992).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). States mandate that
insurance companies provide certain health care and medical coverage under group
health insurance plans. Such mandated-benefit regulation is not preempted by ERISA.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 739-747. ERISA exempts from preemption state
regulation of insurance contracts. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). ERISA does not
mandate the contents of welfare benefits; it regulates their administration. Shaw, 463
U.S. at 91; Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 732.
101. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
102. E.g., Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 456-57; Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 452 F.2d
519, 524 (6th Cir. 1972); Forrest Indus., Inc. v. Local Union No. 3-436, Int'l
Woodworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 381 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir. 1967).
103. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). ERISA does not include a
statute of limitation for claims alleging unlawful termination and modification of
welfare benefit plans under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). See Anderson v. John Morrell
& Co., 830 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1987).
20021 165
35
Holloway: The Practical Entry and Utility of a Legal-Managerial Framework w
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
with federal labor policy and thus the delivery and use of ERISA analy-
sis and information are not subject purely to state common law and its
thinking.' °5 ERISA federalizes common law analysis and thinking,
thus creating new federal limits on managerial discretion and
judgment.
B. Review of Plan Decision to Deny Benefits under ERISA and LMRA
ERISA analysis and information include the judicial review of ben-
efit plan decisions of plan administrators and managers. Federal and
state courts apply ERISA analysis and information to review the exer-
cise of managerial discretion by plan administrators and managers.
The courts construe terms, conditions and provisions of employee ben-
efit plans to give them meaning and also determine the reasonableness
of plan managers and administrators' decisions. 10 6 When these courts
do so, they question the exercise of managerial discretion by plan
administrators and managers in the interpretation of plan terms and
provisions. 10 7 When management retains the discretion to interpret
plan terms and conditions, it retains greater latitude under federal law
in decision-making to accomplish its objectives and strategies under
benefits plans. Federal law and policy govern at-will contracts and
CBAs and thus require the application of ERISA analysis and informa-
tion to business decisions regarding labor and employment. Section
301(a) of LMRA, on one hand, covers breaches of CBAs, though these
breaches are not unfair labor practices.'0" Federal and state courts
decide whether a breach of a CBA violates the rights of labor or man-
agement. When provisions of CBAs are ambiguous, these courts con-
strue the provisions to ascertain their meaning.'0 9 Federal courts do
not give deference to management's interpretation of ambiguous CBA
terms and provisions by applying an arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard. " Federal courts use rules of contract construction to construe
105. See Textile Worker Union, 353 U.S. at 457 (a LMRA claim); Transp.
Communication Employers Union v. Union Pac. R. R., 385 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1966) (a
LMRA claim); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 112-15 (an ERISA claim).
106. See infra notes 114-147 and accompanying text.
107. See id. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the discretion
of managers and administrators under ERISA).
108. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 181 n.20 (1971); Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1956);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rome Indus., 437 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
109. See infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
110. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 181 n.20; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
489 U.S. at 112-13. See also Page, supra note 70, at 50.
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terms and provisions of CBAs." Section 301(a) permits labor and
management to file claims to clarify plan rights and obligations under
CBAs. 1
12
ERISA regulates the decisions of plan administrators and plan
managers under at-will contracts and CBAs." 3 Section 502(a) of ERISA
covers plan decisions by plan administrators and managers who often
reserve managerial discretion to make unilateral plan decisions. In
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Bruch, 114 the Supreme Court
decided the standard of review for reviewing claims filed under Section
502(a)(1)(B)115 when an employee alleges an unlawful denial of
employee welfare benefits by plan administrators. In Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (Firestone) sold
its Plastics Division (Division) to Occidental Co. (Occidental). Occi-
dental rehired the Division's employees. Firestone had maintained a
severance or termination pay plan. Firestone was the administrator
and fiduciary of the termination pay plan, but it had failed to comply
with ERISA requirements for reporting, disclosure and claims proce-
dures. Its plan was an employee benefit plan enforceable under ERISA.
Although Occidental hired former Firestone employees, they still
requested severance benefits from Firestone under its termination pay
plan. Firestone denied their requests on the grounds that the Firestone
plant did not suffer a reduction in workforce when it was sold to Occi-
dental. Such a reduction was required to authorize the payment of
benefits under the terms of the termination pay plan. Employees
brought a civil action against Firestone under Section 502(a)(1)(B) to
recover severance benefits due them under the termination pay plan.
The district court entered summary judgment for Firestone and held
that Firestone's denial of severance benefits was not arbitrary and
capricious.1 1 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit held that the de novo standard of judicial review was more appro-
priate for Firestone's decision denying claims for severance benefits.11 7
Firestone requested review by the Supreme Court under a writ of certi-
orari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
111. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
112. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 157; Manning v. Wiscombe, 498 F.2d
1311 (10th Cir. 1974); Mumford v. Glover, 503 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1974); Int'l Union
v. Yard-man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983).
113. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
114. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
116. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 640 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
117. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari.118 It held that a de novo
standard of review was appropriate in light of pre-ERISA decisions and
present ERISA policy.119 The Supreme Court concluded that the claim
brought by an employee to challenge the denial of a benefit claim had
been governed by contract law prior to the enactment of ERISA. 120 The
Court further concluded that: "[I1f the plan did not give employer or
administrator discretionary or final authority to construe uncertain
terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it would have any
other contract claim-by looking to the terms of the plan and the mani-
festations of the parties' intent."'' The Supreme Court reasoned that
the de novo standard effectuates the policy of ERISA "to promote the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit
plans"' 2 2 and "to protect contractually defined benefits."'1 2 3 However if
118. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
119. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 108-17. The application of the
arbitrary and capricious standard to review welfare benefit claim denials under ERISA
has resulted in much criticism and commentary on the appropriate standard of
review. E.g., J. A. McCheary, Note, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under
ERISA: Its Origins and Application, 23 Duq. L. Rev. 1033 (1985); Gregory M.
Shumaker, Note, Employee Benefits Law: Serving Employee Welfare Benefits Through
ERISA, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 551 (1986); B. R. Duncan, Judicial Review of Fiduciary
Claim Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71
Cornell L. Rev. 986 (1986); J. L. Johnson, Judicial Review of ERISA Plan Administrator
Under the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard, 10 Ind. Rel. L. J. 400 (1988); George I.
Flint, ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 Cath. U.L. Rev. 133
(1989).
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. resulted in scholarly comment and criticisms on the
Court's wisdom and knowledge of trust law and its application to employee welfare
benefit plan claims arising under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B). E.g., M.S. Beaver, The
Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits Cases After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
26 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1 (1990);J.C. Newsome, Note, ERISA - Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
V. Burch: Standard of Review for Denial of Benefits, 20 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 487
(1990); D. W. Holdren, Note, Denial of Benefits Claims Under ERISA: The Rise and Fall
of De Novo Review, 36 Vill. L. Rev. 1219 (1991); J. R. Cox, Note, Pierre v. Connecticut
General Life Insurance Co., Piecing Together ERISA-Plan Administrator Fact Finding
Discretion After Firestone Tire v. Bruch, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1532 (1992); N. C. Capps,
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Are Lower Courts Following The United States
Supreme Court Decision in ERISA Benefit Determination?, 31 Washburn L. J. 280
(1992); J. H. Longbeen, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 207
(1990); G. A. Hwett, Note, De Novo Review of ERISA Plan Administrators' Factual
Determinations, 71 Wash. U. L. Q. 165, 165-74 (1993).
120. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 112-15.
121. Id. at 113.
122. Id. (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90).
123. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 113 (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)).
[Vol. 24:131
38
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol24/iss2/1
THE UTILITY OF A LEGAL-MANAGERIAL FRAMEWORK
the plan administrator or manager retains the authority to construe
ambiguous terms of benefit plans, federal courts must defer to the plan
administrator or manager's construction under claims filed under sec-
tion 502(a)(1)(B). ERISA analysis and information permit administra-
tors to retain the latitude to interpret terms and conditions of benefit
plans. Such interpretations are more than likely consistent with com--
pany objectives and are not necessarily harmful to the interests of plan
participants. Thus ERISA analysis and information preserve manage-
rial discretion for plan administrators and managers to further busi-
ness objectives that are the ends of business decisions, which are
business means.
C. Review of a Plan Decision to Terminate Benefits Under ERISA
ERISA exposes business decisions by plan managers and adminis-
trators to review by courts, but the effects on managerial discretion
may not differ much from the common law. ERISA limits scrutiny to
particular circumstances, thus preserving the managerial discretion of
plan managers and administrators. The standard of review for claims
challenging the elimination of a welfare benefit plan under Section 502
(a)(1)(B) was announced in DeGreare v. Slattery Group, Inc.12 4 In
DeGreare, the Court made the de novo standard applicable to the termi-
nation and modification of welfare benefits under Section 502(a). The
Court granted certiorari and instructed the lower federal courts to
apply the de novo standard to actions brought under Section
502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA for the termination and modification of health
and life insurance benefits. 125 In DeGreare, the Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit with instructions to consider Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. 126 In DeGreare, plaintiffs alleged that vested postretire-
ment welfare benefits were unilaterally terminated by their former
employer in violation of ERISA. The plaintiffs were retired salaried
employees of Alpha's Cement Division (Alpha). The retirees filed a suit
alleging that Alpha violated ERISA by terminating their life and health
insurance benefits without their consent. The retirees alleged that their
welfare benefits vested upon retirement and thus could not be unilater-
ally terminated by Alpha. Alpha construed the terms and conditions
of the amendment and termination clause and argued that it had
124. 489 U.S. 1049 (1989), sub nom., DeGreare v. Alpha Portland Ind., Inc., 652 F.
Supp. 946 (E.D. Mo. 1986), 837 F.2d. 812 (8th Cir. 1988).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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reserved the right to terminate welfare benefits and these benefits did
not vest at retirement. 12
7
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri found that language of the welfare benefit plan was ambigu-
ous. 128 The district court considered extrinsic evidence offered by
Alpha's personnel manager that employees had been informed of the
indefinite duration of welfare benefits and that other Alpha employees
at two other plants had been informed to seek insurance elsewhere
upon the closing of those plants. Moreover, the district court found
that retirees had not objected to a statement printed in an earlier Sum-
mary Plan Description 129 ("SPD") in which they were informed by
Alpha that it reserved the right to terminate and modify the welfare
benefit plan. The district court held that welfare benefits did not vest
upon retirement, 130 and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding.' 3 ' The Eighth Cir-
cuit held that postretirement health and life insurance benefits did not
vest upon retirement. 132 The Eighth Circuit found that terms of the
welfare benefit plan were ambiguous. 133 It concluded that continua-
tion language in the welfare benefit plan did not support vesting. 134
The Eighth Circuit found that the deference that was given by the dis-
trict court to the administrator's decision in construing the plan docu-
ments was appropriate. 135
On the remand of DeGreare by the Court, the Eighth Circuit fol-
lowed the Court's instructions and subsequently gave its reasoning in
a footnote of another decision on the termination of a welfare benefits
plan. 136 Although DeGreare had not been decided under a de novo
standard of review, the Eighth Circuit states emphatically that it did
not reverse its judgment after the Court's remand of DeGreare.137
127. Id. at 816.
128. DeGreare v. Alpha Portland Ind., Inc., 837 F.2d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 1988),
vacated by, 489 U.S. 1049 (1989).
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). ERISA requires that a
Summary Plan Description (hereinafter cited as SPD) be furnished participants and
beneficiaries of employee welfare benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a). ERISA lists
specific information that should be contained in a SPD. Id. at § 1022(b).
130. DeGreare, 837 F.2d at 813.
131. Id. at 817.
132. Id. at 815.
133. Id. at 816.
134. Id. at 815-16.
135. Id.
136. Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1109 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990).
137. Id.
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Although the judgment of the district court in DeGreare was made
under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the Eighth Cir-
cuit still found that the judgment of the district court would not
change under a de novo standard of review. 138 It observed that in its
review of DeGreare, it concluded that the district court had taken suffi-
cient testimony and reviewed enough documents under the arbitrary
and capricious standard and thus the district court's decision would
have the same outcome under a de novo review. 139
If the analysis and legal information of common law is consistent
with federal policy, then supplementing ERISA analysis and informa-
tion with common law trusts and contracts turns ERISA toward the
common law by preserving for employers and managers broad mana-
gerial discretion and judgment to allocate labor, capital and other
resources. The arbitrary and capricious standard preserves greater
discretion for plan decision-makers in deciding benefit plans. This
standard preserves managerial discretion that had been vested in plan
managers and administrators by contract, employment and trust doc-
trines. Fairness and equity may not favor employees and retirees, espe-
cially when plan managers or administrators retain the discretion to
interpret ambiguous terms and provisions of their welfare benefits
plans and terminate these plans at will.' 4 ° Managers or employers
have a strong economic interest to maintain profits and reduce costs,
which just happens to be a dominant self-interest of any business
organization.14 1 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. permits employers to
reserve the discretionary power to construe ambiguous terms and pro-
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Plan administrators are still bound
by fiduciary standards under ERISA and thus cannot ignore the interests of
participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1104.
For commentary on the fiduciary responsibilities of plan administrators and plan
managers, see generally Mary 0. Jensen, Note, Separating Business Decision and
Fiduciary Duty in ERISA Litigation?, 10 BYU. Pub. L. 139 (1996); Nancy G. Ross &
Judith A. Kelley, Employer Duties to Make Benefits Disclosures: The Emerging Case Law,
8 Benefits L. J. 5, 5-23 (Summer 1995); Nancy G. Ross & Judith A. Kelley,
Misrepresenting Future Plan Changes: Fiduciary Liability under ERISA, 21 Employee
Relations L. J. 73 (1995); Jon C. Bruning, ERISA Plan Fiduciaries Beware, 45 LAB. L. J.
402 (1994); Nick C. Geonnacopulos & Daniel J. Julius, Understanding Document
Disclosure Requirements under ERISA, 45 Lab. L. J. 359 (1994); Edward E. Bintz,
Fiduciary Responsibility under ERISA: Is There Ever a Fiduciary Duty To Disclose?, 54 U.
Pitt. L. Rev: 979 (1993).
141. See Holdren, supra note 119, at 1252-55; Cox, supra note 119, at 1532. See also
supra note 21 and accompanying text (recognizing that discretion permits employers
to make decisions in their best interest).
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visions of employee benefit plans. 1 4 2 If they reserve this discretionary
power, federal courts must apply the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review in evaluating plan terms and conditions in the management
of benefit plans by plan administrators. 143 The arbitrary and capri-
cious standard, which gives deference to plan managers and plan
administrators, 14 4 requires only that the employer's decision be rea-
sonable (not correct or just) and thus makes it difficult for retirees to
prove that benefits had vested or were due them under ambiguous
amendment and termination clauses.' 45 Firestone and DeGreare retain
much common law discretion 146 and thus limit the impact of ERISA
analysis and information on the process of decision-making by not
imposing heightened review of plan decisions. 147
142. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 112-13. Several factors must be taken
into consideration in determining whether plan administrators were arbitrary and
capricious in denying, terminating or modifying a welfare benefit plan. Courts have
considered the following factors: "[Tihe uniformity of a plan administrator's
construction of a disputed provision of the plan, the reasonableness of the plan
administrator's construction of plan terms in light of the express terms of the plan,
whether the administrator's interpretation was fair, and whether the interpretation
attempts to prevent unanticipated costs." Holdren, supra note 119, at 1237-38 (citingJ.
A. McCheary, Note, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under ERISA: Its Origins
and Application, 23 Duq. L. Rev. 1033, 1047-57 (1985)). See B. R. Duncan, Judicial
Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and
Capricious Test, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 986, 994-95 (1986). See also Holdren, supra note
119, at 1238 n.83 (citing Hoover v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 855 F.2d 1538
(11th Cir. 1988)) (applying those factors). "Some courts have considered the good
faith of the administrator in assessing whether the administrator's decisions were
arbitrary and capricious." Holdren, supra note 119, at 1238 n.83 (citing Hoover, 855
F.2d at 1538; Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 822 F.2d 623, 626 (6th Cir.
1987); Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982)). Finally,
an actual or potential conflict of interest between plan administrator and the plan may
need to be taken in consideration when the court selects a standard of review. See
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115; infra note 147 and accompanying text.
143. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 112-13.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Page, supra note 70, at 50; Holdren, supra note 119, at 1238.
146. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. may have little short-term or long-term effects on
the unilateral termination and modification of employee benefit plans. See infra note
147 and accompanying text.
147. See generally supra notes 119-135 and accompanying text (The Court observed
that plan managers or employers have broad latitude under many ERISA provisions.).
In employment relations that are contractual relationships, the Court permits a
deferential standard of review where a potential conflict of interest exists and thus
favors the business discretion of economics relationships such as employment and
labor. This preference maintains broad management discretion rather than imposing
a strict standard of review to limit abuses of discretion by administrators.
Management can successfully shift the risk, thus leaving retirees and employees to find
42
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol24/iss2/1
THE UTILITY OF A LEGAL-MANAGERIAL FRAMEWORK
ERISA analysis and information still limit managerial discretion
by imposing technical guidelines and procedures on the process of
business decision-making. Part V describes the affects of ERISA analy-
sis and information on management methodology and thinking. Man-
agement thinking provides rational decisions that are subject to
theories and principles of business functions, such as management,
finance and accounting. These theories and principles are business
thinking and recognize many managerial actions and benefits, includ-
ing increasing profits and reducing costs. The need and utility of man-
agerial benefits that are recognized by finance, management and other
principles often drive business decision-making, which must also
weigh the impact of law and public policy. The impact of law and
public policy on business has greatly diminished managerial practices
and thinking, thus justifying a legal-managerial framework to evaluate
law and use legal advice.
V. EFFECTS OF ERISA PROCEDURES ON BUSINESS METHODOLOGY
ERISA demonstrates the need for a legal-managerial framework
that can study the impact of law and public policy on business meth-
odology and thinking. Managing and admininstering employee benefit
plan create complex managerial needs14 and thus justify a legal-mana-
their own solution to health care and other plan needs. This risk shifting is plain and
simple externalization. In avoiding a potential conflict of interest, the Court did not
turn a deaf ear to a conflict of interest in plan administration. It considered this. The
Court concluded that such conflicts should be considered the same as any other factor
in determining reasonableness of employer and plan administrator's decisions. See
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115.
148. See generally supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the steps in the
process of decision-making). For a fuller discussion of the impact of decision-making
procedures under section 402(b)(3) on plan amendments and terminations, see James
E. Holloway, The ERISA Amendment Provision as a Disclosure Function: Including
Workable Termination Procedures in the Functional Purpose of Section 402(b)(3), 46
Drake L. Rev. 755 (1998); James E. Holloway & Douglas K Schneider, ERISA, FASB
and Benefit Plan Amendments: A Section 402(b)(3) Violation As a Loss Contingency for a
Plan Amendment, 46 Drake L. Rev. 97, 148 (1997).
Basic management science textbooks teach that decision-making often takes place
under uncertainty for some events and activities. See, e.g., David R. Anderson, et al.,
AN INTRODUCTION TO MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES TO DECISION-
MAKING 593 (7th ed. 1994). Law and public policy are not absolutely clear. See David
Landsbergen & Janet F. Orosz, Why Public Managers Should Not Be Afraid to Enter the
"Gray Zone," 28 Admin. & Soc'y 238, 239 (1996); infra note 156 and accompanying
text. Courts and legislatures may purposely create this ambiguity. Landsbergen &
Orosz, supra, at 239. Legal ambiguity creates a gray zone where the risks and
liabilities associated with decisional consequences are not known with any degree of
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gerial framework to understand how ERISA analysis and information
affects the decision situation and other steps of the process of business
decision-making.
A. Decision-Making Procedures for Benefits Plan Management
ERISA analysis and information affect human resources and
financial management decisions by imposing rigid and restrictive deci-
sional procedures on the process of decision-making. The nature of
rigid and restrictive decisional procedures justifies a legal-managerial
framework to study and then enter L-M analysis and legal information
in the process of decision-making. Decisional procedures can delay
certainty. In discussing the gray zone in public management, Landsbergen and Orosz
state:
Because the law is very often silent and ambiguous, managers need to make
use of this "gray zone" when considering strategic management options.
The ambiguity of the gray zone could result from vague political compromise,
insufficient facts upon which a clear legislative decision could have been
made, or a decision by a legislature to avoid making hard choices. ... Part of
the value of ambiguity in law is that it can unite diverse interests and provide
managers with options because problems change in structure and definition
as other plausible interpretations are advance.
Despite the fact that the creation of law and legal ambiguity is the product of
social discourse and interpretation [R. J. Green, Constitutional Jurisprudence:
Reviving Praxis in Public Administration, 24 Admin. & Soc'y 3, 3-21 (1992)],
public managers are noticeably absent from this discourse because of their
simplistic understanding that they cannot act unless they have been told how
to act. By default, managers have ceded the gray zone to the lawyers. As a
result, public management has developed an excessive focus on legal norms,
especially procedural due process, to the exclusion of managerial norms.
Landsbergen & Orosz, supra, at 239. Private sector managers need not worry about
procedural due process, but they may not be selecting the better alternatives occurring
in the gray zone. If their lawyers see that legal liabilities and risks are too great, they
may not consider alternatives in the gray zone. Selecting an alternative that included a
gray zone issues may make a manager look as if he or she is a hardened criminal or
evil wrongdoer. Gray zone issue that later prove to be unlawful will be considered
unlawful from the very beginning and thus the manager should have known or could
have known he or she was committing a wrong. Often managers and lawyers do not
know outcomes of gray zone issues and thus must take risk. Gray zone issues create
uncertainty and thus business decision-making must take place under uncertainty.
But competitors, prosecutors and injured parties do not want to hear that the
managers made a bad decision under legal and policy uncertainty. See also supra note
148 and accompanying text.
For commentary on strategic management in the private sector under legal,
political and regulatory environments, see also Richard H. K. Veitor, STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND INDUSTRY NOTES (1989).
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and restrain the ability of plan managers to respond to financial mar-
kets and other circumstances by limiting the utility of results of a step
in the decision-making process. Moreover, decisional procedures bur-
den managerial discretion by imposing assurances on the decision-
making process that involve actions of various persons, exercises of
different authority and uses of diverse thinking. For example, in Cur-
tiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,'4 9 Curtiss-Wright Corp. established
a postretirement health benefit program for its employees at its Wood-
Ridge, New Jersey plant. 150 In September 1976, Curtiss-Wright estab-
lished a welfare benefit plan (CW Plan) to comply with the recently
enacted ERISA. 1 5 ' The major documents of the CW Plan were the Con-
stitution and Summary Plan Description (SPD).' 52 In the CW Plan,
Curtiss-Wright had always reserved the right to amend, modify and
terminate its Plan.' 53 In 1983, Curtiss-Wright Corp. issued a new SPD
and also changed carriers. 154 This SPD included a new provision that
stated: "TERMINATION OF HEALTH CARE BENEFITS .... Coverage
under this plan will cease for retirees and their dependents upon the
termination of business operations of the facility from which they
retired.' 1 55 The primary authors of the new provision were the direc-
tor of benefits and labor counsel, who stated that they only intended to
clarify the terms of the reservation clause.' 5 6 These decision-makers
overlooked the fact that ERISA analysis and information would affect
the selection of plan decisions by imposing decisional procedures. In
fact, such a direct influence on the process of decision-making controls
and limits company decision-makers who could exercise specific man-
agerial discretion and judgment under the plan.
149. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995).
150. Id. at 75-76.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. ERISA and other law delay or prohibit the consideration of alternatives and
selection of business decisions when these alternatives and decisions violate law that
is not perfectly clear. Gray areas consist of ambiguity, uncertainty and generality that
affect the evaluation and then delivery and use of L-M analysis and legal information.
Gray area decisions that appear lawful may not be sustainable under future
interpretations of law and public policy. Consequently, regulation, common law and
public policy can even limit or restrict apparently lawful decisions that later show
inconsistency with law or public policy during subsequent steps of decision-making,
namely implementation and follow-up steps. See supra note 148 and accompanying
text.
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When plan decision-makers allegedly select unlawful decisional
alternatives, ERISA analysis and information can add uncertainty in
the implementation and follow-up of the decision until courts decide
the disputes arising under any ambiguous provision of ERISA. For
example, in November 1983, Curtiss-Wright announced that it was
closing the Wood-Ridge plant and that it would terminate retiree bene-
fits for non-union employees who had retired from Wood-Ridge.
157
The executive vice president wrote retirees "a series of letters informing
them that their postretirement health benefits were being terminated"
by Curtiss-Wright. 158 In 1984, retirees sued Curtiss-Wright Corp. for
a violation of section 402(b)(3) 59 of ERISA, alleging that revisions
were actually new terms rather than the clarification of old terms.
160
Retirees asserted that the new term that reserved the right to terminate
in the event of a plant closure was an amendment to the CW Plan.' 6 '
Curtiss-Wright responded to retirees' claim by stating that the new
term of the new SPD was merely language clarifying its plan.1 62 Cur-
tiss-Wright implemented the plan decision, assuming that this deci-
sion had certain consequences - termination of the plan at the closing
of the plant. It was not certain. In 1990, the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey concluded that Curtiss-Wright had
made an amendment to its plan in 1983, when it revised its SPD to
state that its plan would terminate at the closing of its facilities.
163
The district court found that Curtiss-Wright's revision to its SPD was a
plan amendment to the CW Plan in violation of section 402(b)(3) of
ERISA. 164 Next, the district court found that the CW Plan failed to
provide a plan procedure for identifying who possessed authority to
amend the plan and a procedure for amending the plan as required by
section 402(b)(3) of ERISA. 165 The district court concluded that
adding the new term was a substantial change to the CW Plan.166 It
further concluded that Curtiss-Wright amended the plan but did not
provide the necessary procedures to identify who could amend the
plan, nor how to amend the plan and therefore violated section
157. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 75-76.
158. Id.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
160. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 75-76.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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402(b)(3).' 67 The United States Court of Appeals for Third Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court.' 68  Here, Curtis-Wright
and other companies learned that ERISA's decisional procedures are
rigid and thus must be followed by plan managers in making some
plan decisions.
The Court did not agree that ERISA's technical procedures and
guidelines should operate, in this instance, the same as substantive
mandates. Acting more like a common law court, the Court recog-
nized that ERISA analysis and information do not usurp the manage-
rial discretion existing under corporate authority, namely the
authority to change past decisions. Curtiss-Wright asked the Court to
grant a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit to decide whether Curtiss-Wright provided a procedure
to identify who possessed authority to amend the plan and whether it
also provided a procedure to amend the plan.169 The Court granted a
writ of certiorari'70 and reversed the Third Circuit on its interpretation
of section 402(b)(3). 17 ' The Court concluded that "[tihe Company"
was sufficient under the reservation clause of the CW plan to identify
persons who possessed amendment authority because "[tihe Com-
pany" required persons to look only to Curtiss-Wright for the exercise
of this authority. 172 Next, the Court concluded that the reservation
clause provided a procedure for amending the plan by stating "by the
Company."' 73 The Court found "by the Company" to be "the barest of
167. Id. The district court also held that the Curtiss-Wright Corporation's
[hereinafter Curtiss-Wright Corp.] plan termination was ineffective under the
amended term of its plan. Id. As a remedy for Curtiss-Wright Corporation's
procedural violation, the district court awarded retirees a $2.6 million judgment. Id.
Both retirees and Curtiss-Wright Corporation appealed. Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 18 F.3d 1034 (3d Cir. 1994), rev'd, Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84 (1995).
168. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d at 1042, rev'd, Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 541 U.S. 73, 84 (1995).
169. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 78.
170. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 512 U.S. 1288 (1994).
171. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84 (1995). The Court
concluded that section 402(b)(3) requires companies to establish "a procedure for
identifying persons with amendment authority, rather than identification of those
persons outright." Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 79.
172. Id. at 79. The Court noted that "the Company's amendment procedure is
substantial because it requires beneficiaries, retirees, employees, and others to look to
the company, and not to outside parties, to exercise amendment authority. The
Company functions as an identification procedure as required by ERISA. In addition,
ERISA requires companies to establish a procedure for amending the plan." Id.
173. Id.
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procedures" but was "more substantial than it first appeared" and that
section 402(b)(3) was "indifferent to the level of detail" in these proce-
dures. 174 The Court reasoned that Curtiss-Wright could amend its
plan at-will without the consent of retirees or third parties and thus
recognized managerial discretion to make decisions in the best interest
of the company. 175 Under a managerial analysis with law, the Court's
interpretation of section 402(b)(3) affects financial, labor and other
decisions by requiring decision-making procedures that must identify
who possesses and uses management authority in selecting among
competing alternatives in plan management. Effectively, ERISA limits
plan decision-making to a few managers.
The common law would rarely limit managerial discretion by
imposing decisional procedures to execute authority in the allocation
of labor and other resources. One has only to remember the employ-
ment at-will doctrine. ERISA differs from the common law, but other
174. Id. at 79-80.
175. See id. at 82. The Court concluded that section 402(b)(3) "ensure[s] that every
plan has a workable amendment procedure." Id. The court of appeals had concluded
that section 402(b)(3) "ensures that interested parties will know how a plan may be
altered and who may make such alterations." Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d at 1038.
The Third Circuit also concluded that retirees and others persons should "be able to
determine with certainty at any given time exactly what the plan provides." Id. The
Supreme Court did not agree with the court of appeals' interpretation of section
402(b)(3) and concluded that detail and specification were not requirements of
section 402(b)(3) and that other provisions of ERISA provided adequate protection for
the rights of retirees and employees. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S at 80.
The Court's interpretation of section 402(b)(3) did not end all uncertainty that
had been caused by the failure of companies to comply with section 402(b)(3) when
they made substantial changes in plan terms and conditions. Now the federal circuits
do not agree on whether section 402(b)(3) should be applied to a plan termination
that is by far more devastating than many plan amendments.
The Third and Eleventh Circuits are split on whether "the requirements of section
402(b)(3) apply to plan terminations ...." Ackerman v. Warnaco, Inc., 55 F.3d 117,
121 (3d Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit reasoned that ERISA protects against both a
plan amendment and plan termination, finding that plan terminations and plan
amendments are categorically similar in effects. Id. (citing Deibler v. United Food &
Commercial Workers' Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that section 402(b)(3) requires "employers to adopt written plan
instruments and establish written amendment procedures" to apprise employees and
retirees of their obligations and rights." Aldridge v. Lily-Tulip, Inc. Salary Retirement
Plan Benefits Comm., 40 F.3d 1202, 1210 (11th Cir. 1994). The Third Circuit
concluded that refusing to apply section 402(b)(3) to a plan termination undermines
the purposes of section 402(b)(3). Aldridge, 40 F.3d at 1210. Both circuits disagree
regarding the functional nature of section 402(b)(3) that protects against changing or
amending benefit plans under many circumstances that are less onerous than plan
terminations.
178
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law may not be as broad as ERISA. Consequently, the business need
for certainty and flexibility justifies a managerial analysis with law
that evaluates and then enters ERISA analysis and information into the
business decision-making process.
B. Decision-Making Procedures to Identify the Sources of Authority
Common law permits corporate managers to exercise authority in
the absence of corporate officials and thus does not impose restrictive
decisional procedures on the exercise of managerial discretion under
corporate authority. Decision-makers must have authority to make the
decision, but delegating certain decisions to particular managers lim-
its decision-making to one person or a group of persons. Thus, delega-
tion may delay making and implementing a plan decision if only one
manager has authority to make certain decisions. ERISA analysis and
information affect the decision-making process by restricting who can
be a plan decision-maker within business organizations for plan man-
agement. ERISA limits the definition of business situation in plan
management to the fewest decision-makers who must provide for the
delivery and use of other analyses and information in the decision-
making process. In doing so, ERISA relies on the law of corporations
to identify who possesses and exercises authority to make decisions on
behalf of the corporation. The Revised Model Business Corporation
Act ("RMBCA") states that "[aIll corporate powers shall be exercised by
or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion managed under the direction of its board of directors, subject to
any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation."'1 76 The board
of directors uses its power to establish business policy and define tasks
for officers and managers.177 ERISA federalizes corporate law and may
create less flexibility in initiating decisions to amend plans.
176. Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 8.01 (1984) [hereinafter RMBCA].
177. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr. et al., LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 372-74 (4th ed. 1990); Richard 1. Henderson, COMPENSATION
MANAGEMENT: REWARDING PERFORMANCE 38-48 (5th ed. 1989). The board of directors
can also create committees unless prohibited by the articles of incorporation. RMBCA
§ 8.25 (1984). These committees may exercise the authority of the board of directors,
with some exceptions. Id. at § 8.25(d) & (e). These committees also could be
delegated authority by the board of directors to modify and amend benefits pension
and welfare benefit plans. See id. Senior management that consists of chief operating
officer, president, vice president and other executive managers implement corporate
policies of the board of directors. See id. § 8.40. These officers and managers are
appointed by the board of directors or described in the. bylaws. Id. The board of
directors, bylaws, and articles of incorporation define the duties and authority of these
officers and managers. Id. Corporate officers are granted authority to implement board
20021
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ERISA analysis and information impose decisional obligations by
limiting explicitly the exercise of authority to named persons and thus
affects the nature and timing of plan decisions responding directly to
market conditions and organizational problems. In Curtiss-Wright, the
Court concluded that it could not determine on the record whether
Curtiss-Wright's board of directors had delegated the authority to
amend the CW Plan to a corporate officer or senior manager. 178 Cor-
porate officers are authorized to act on behalf of the corporation.'
79
The Court noted that authority may be "inferred from circumstances
or implied from the acquiescence of the corporation or its agents in a
general course of business."'18 The Court observed that if the new
provision was not properly authorized when issued, then subsequent
actions could later ratify the unauthorized amendment."8 The Court
instructed the court of appeals to consider whether letters that had
been written by the executive vice president' 82 stating that the CW
Plan was being terminated, served to ratify this amendment if the
amendment was unauthorized under Curtiss-Wright's procedure for
amending its plan.' 83 ERISA analysis and information create the need
to identify particular decision-makers for certain company decisions
that are influenced by events and transactions in dynamic political,
economic and social conditions. The impact of ERISA on decision-
makers and their exercise of authority affects business methodology
by imposing limits on the process of business decision-making, includ-
ing the nature of the process, the timing of the decision and the pres-
ence of the decision-makers. Therefore, legal-managerial framework is
the better mechanism to ascertain a regulation's effects on business
methodology and thinking.
C. Decision-Making Procedures to Effect Unauthorized Acts
ERISA analysis and information require senior decision-makers to
ratify or approve unauthorized decisions that reflect company efforts
of directors' business policies and other corporate tasks, including establishing
employee benefits and other compensation plans. See id.. Corporate officers can
implicitly or explicitly grant authority to senior management to amend, modify or
terminate employee pension and welfare benefit plans. Id. See Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
514 U.S. at 80-81.
178. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 85.
179. Kempin, supra note 177, at 388, 397.
180. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 85 (citing 2 W. Fletcher, Encyclopedia of the
Law of Private Corporations § 444, 397-98 (1990)).
181. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 85.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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to manage employee benefit plans and thus may create uncertainty
regarding the validity of decisions and stability of plans when compa-
nies implement unauthorized decisions. The board of directors and
corporate officers can ratify many types of agreements, actions and
contracts. 1 4 They cannot ratify the contracts of corporate officers and
senior managers who engage in "extraordinary or fundamental acts,"
such as the mortgaging of corporate assets, that require the approval of
shareholders.'8 5 Amending certain plan terms should not be deemed
an extraordinary or fundamental act but should be a simple compensa-
tion management decision that does not require shareholder
approval.'8 6 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court held that "[t]he Company"
identified that Curtiss-Wright possessed authority to amend and that
"by the Company" reserved for Curtiss-Wright's board of directors the
authority to amend the plan. 87 The Court did not conclude that this
authority could only be exercised if the board of directors approved the
amendment.188 It only required that Curtiss-Wright delegate the
authority to a named person(s) who would make the decision and then
follow a procedure to amend the plan.18 9 Thus, the Court made ratifi-
cation a viable alternative so long as a Curtiss-Wright officer or the
board of directors had the power to authorize the amendment. 190 Until
ratification takes place, uncertainty and instability exist under the
imprecise delivery and inexact use of ERISA analysis and information.
Thus, complete implementation and follow-up could be delayed while
an executive or the board of directors recognizes the decision.
Ratification adds to ERISA analysis and information the common
law thinking that gave broad managerial discretion in plan manage-
ment and administration. The board of directors can ratify unautho-
rized decisions of its officers and senior managers if the board of
directors could legally approve these acts without shareholder
approval.' 9 ' In Curtiss-Wright, the Court instructed that ratification
could be considered on remand if the "new plan provision is found not
to have been properly authorized... ."192 Although ERISA analysis and
184. Kempin, supra note 177, at 392, 397.
185. See id. (citing Lee v. Jenkins, 268 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1959)); Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 514 U.S. at 77-80.
186. See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 77-80; Henderson, supra note 177, at 409-
11.
187. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 77-80.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 80, 84-85.
190. See id. at 77-78.
191. See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 85; Kempin, supra note 177, at 397.
192. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 85.
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information create uncertainty regarding the validity of unauthorized
plan decisions, the Court permits ratification to save unauthorized
decisions that were exercises of corporate authority under managerial
discretion. Here ERISA analysis and information affect the process of
decision-making by making the implementation and follow-up vulner-
able to legal and policy challenges as unlawful exercises of corporate
authority to make plan decisions.
A legal-managerial framework includes the formation of L-M
analysis to accompany legal information. Using this framework to
enter ERISA analysis and information in the process of the business
decision-making makes it more likely that plan managers will ascer-
tain the possession and exercise of corporate authority. This entry
and utility of ERISA analysis and information in plan decision-making
should have raised business concerns regarding the possession and
exercise of corporate authority by decision-makers long before the defi-
nition of a decision situation. The point here is that an evaluation of the
validity, utility and impact of ERISA regulation under business con-
cepts, such as decision theories and principles, should have taken
place long before the existence of any decision situation that would
require the entry and utility (or application in practice) of ERISA analy-
sis and information in the decision-making process. This evaluation
provides a broad understanding of the impact of ERISA on managerial
discretion in advance of any manager's use of ERISA analysis and infor-
mation in the process of decision-making. In summing up, the use of
pre-decisional analysis moved the decision-making process beyond a
factual analysis (comparison) of past precedents (common law think-
ing) into an expansive managerial analysis of the law that weighs the
impact of law and public policy on business methodology and the
impact of the business decision on a particular regulation and public
policy. A managerial analysis with law uses business principles and
theories to evaluate the impact of law and public policy on business
methodology and thinking before the use of L-M analysis to accom-
pany legal information in the decision-making process.
VI. EFFECTS OF ERISA DISCLOSURE ON BUSINESS METHODOLOGY
A legal-managerial framework has its roots in common law analy-
sis and information that did not require broad disclosure of findings
and thinking of the business decision-making to allocate labor, finan-
cial and other resources. ERISA is just the opposite of common law;
managers must include the disclosure of decisions and their findings
and thinking. ERISA restrains managerial discretion, which includes
organizational flexibility, by imposing decisional procedures and
[Vol. 24:131
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guidelines on plan decision-making for plan management and adminis-
tration before or during the decisional steps of implementation or fol-
low-up to the decision. ERISA may limit quicker external and internal
reactions and responses through plan decision-making. For example,
section 402(b)(3) 19 3 of ERISA does not require detailed amendment
procedures for a company to amend a benefits plan,194 and Curtiss-
Wright is silent on applying termination procedures to the termination
of welfare benefit plans. 195 Benefit plans can be changed with few plan
procedures in place, but eventually plan administrators or plan manag-
ers must disclose amendments, terminations and modifications to
benefit plans. Section 104(b)(1)' 96 requires plan administrators to dis-
close plan modifications and changes to plan participants and benefi-
ciaries. 197 Congress responded by amending section 104(b)(1) to give
greater protection to group health care benefits by imposing different
requirements on modifications to heath care benefit plans. 9 ' These
requirements of ERISA analysis and information impose different
restrictions on different types of employee benefits and thus require
different findings and thinking on decision-making for the administra-
tion and management of employee benefit plans.
Only a legal-managerial framework can address the decisional
complexities raised by the impact and entry of ERISA in business deci-
sion-making and thinking. Business decisions and concepts must
respond directly to organizational needs, market conditions, and
finance, accounting and other discipline-specific findings and informa-
tion. Part VI illustrates the validity and utility of a legal-managerial
framework to evaluate and enter ERISA disclosure (or make public)
requirements into the process of decision-making, including the use of
193. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For a complete discussion of
the application of section 402(b)(3) to a plan termination and amendment, see supra
note 148 and accompanying text.
194. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 85.
195. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Warnaco Inc., 53 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1995). See also
James E. Holloway, The ERISA Amendment Provision As a Disclosure Function: Including
Workable Termination Procedures in the Functional Purpose of Section 402(b)(3), 46
Drake L. Rev. 755 (1998) (arguing that plan terminations should not be subject to the
same procedures applied to plan amendments).
196. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
197. See Ackerman, 55 F.3d at 124 n.7; Rucker v. Pacific FM, Inc., 806 F. Supp.
1453, 1458-59 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
198. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 101-
191, § 101(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1951 (Aug. 26, 1996), codified as amended at, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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decisional findings, such as assumptions, inferences and conclusions,
before and after the selection of the decision.
A. Affecting Managerial Discretion through Disclosure Requirements
ERISA analysis and information impose managerial obligations
on plan administrators and managers to prohibit them from taking
advantage of plan participants by not disclosing plan decisions and
events. The disclosure of changes to or adverse effects on benefit plans
may give labor, capital, financial and securities markets and local,
state and federal policy-makers usable information and facts on a com-
pany's financial condition, but the latter disclosure may not be in the
company's best interest. A managerial analysis with law uses ERISA
and other laws and public policies concurrently with business analy-
ses and information to minimize disruptions in evaluating alternatives,
implementing the decision and other decisional steps that contain
findings and thinking of plan decision-making not generally available to
public markets, institutions and officials. To illustrate, disclosure
requirements govern welfare benefit plans but generally do not require
plan managers or administrators to promptly notify plan participants
and beneficiaries of a plan termination.' 99 Section 104(b)(1)2 °° of
ERISA requires that plan administrators must give notice to partici-
199. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
200. Id. The pertinent language of section 104(b)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b)(1)(1994 & Supp. IV 1998), states that:
§ 1024. Filing and furnishing of information
(b) Publication of summary plan description and annual report to
participants and beneficiaries of plan. ...
(1) The plan administrator shall furnish to each participant, and each
beneficiaries receiving benefits under the plan, a copy of the summary plan
description, and all modifications and changes referred to in section
102(a)(1)-
If there is a modification or change described in section 102(a)(1) (other
than a material reduction in covered services or benefits provided in the case of
group health plan (as defined in section 733(a)(1))), a summary description of
such modification or change shall be furnished not later than 210 days after the
end of the plan year in which the change is adopted to each participant, and to
each beneficiary who is receiving benefits under the plan.
Id. Section 102(a)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1), states that: "A summary of any
material modification in the terms of the plan and any change in the information
required under subsection (b) of this section shall be written in a manner calculated to
be understood by the average plan participant and shall be furnished in accordance
with section 1024(b)(1) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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pants and beneficiaries after the plan has been modified or changed
but is silent on whether they must give notice after the plan has been
terminated.2° ' Section 104(b)(1) applies to modifications and changes
that are not as devastating as a complete elimination of benefits. 2
The harshness of a complete elimination of welfare benefits leads one
to ask whether such an elimination of benefits should require prompt
notice.20 3 ERISA analysis and information could easily lead one to
respond positively. The "two .. .purposes behind ERISA's reporting
and disclosure provisions .. .ensure that 'the individual participant
knows exactly where he stands with respect to the plan' and... 'enable
employees to police their plans.' "204 ERISA looks as though it justifies
prompt notice, but ERISA analysis and information is in the gray areas
on prompt notice; therefore, any decision eventually raising a prompt
notice issue may be ripe with managerial uncertainty for plan adminis-
trators and managers.
Few courts have decided whether section 104(b)(1) applies to the
termination of non-health and health care benefits and few have had
opportunities to consider the question of prompt notice. One such
court is the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. It concluded that section 104(b)(1) applied to a complete
elimination of benefits and that notice of 210 days was not prompt
enough.205 In Rucker v. Pacific FM, Inc.,206 the plaintiff, a disabled
worker, filed an ERISA claim, alleging among other things, that defend-
ants, Pacific FM, Inc. (Pacific FM and its insurance carrier), violated
201. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See also Ackerman, 55
F.3d at 123; Rucker, 806 F. Supp. at 1459.
202. See Ackerman, 55 F.3d at 123; Rucker, 806 F. Supp. at 1459.
203. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
204. Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
865 (1985).
205. Rucker, 806 F. Supp. at 1453. A court of appeals addressed this issue and
concluded that 104(b)(1) applies to a plan termination but refused to decide whether
210 days were not prompt enough. Id. A district court addressed the same issue and
concluded that section 104(b)(1) applies to the termination of welfare benefits and
that 210 days was not prompt enough for a termination of benefits. Ackerman, 55 F.3d
at 125. Moreover, recent amendments to section 104(b)(1) do not significantly affect
the district court and court of appeals' interpretation of section 104(b)(1). These
amendments and administrative regulations define a material reduction in covered
services but are not absolutely clear on whether a material reduction includes a
complete elimination of benefits. These regulations provide prompt or shorter notice
periods but a district court had already concluded that 210 days were not prompt
enough. Rucker, 806 F. Supp. at 1456.
206. 806 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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procedural requirements of ERISA.2 °7 Defendants moved for summary
judgment and argued that they owed no fiduciary duties to the plaintiff
and that they did not violate any procedural requirements of ERISA.2 °s
The defendants discharged the plaintiff from his position on July 10,
1991.209 Defendants' employee benefit plan "included a long-term dis-
ability benefits (LTD) policy. '210 In a cost-cutting program, defend-
ants terminated LTD benefits so that these benefits were not available
to the plaintiff when he was discharged.2 1' Defendants argued that
they had notified plaintiff of changes to their employee benefit plan.212
However, the disclosures did not state that LTD benefits were being
terminated.21 3
ERISA analysis and information impose specific obligations on
plan administrators and other obligations on plan managers (employ-
ers) that are, at times, the same entity. Pacific FM argued that they had
discharged their fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff under section
104(b)(1).214 The defendants stated that they had provided plaintiff
notice of material changes or modifications within 210 days. 21 They
noted that the plan year ended on December 31, 1990 and that plain-
tiff knew by July 29, 1991 that the LTD benefits had been terminated
by them.2 16 Section 104(b)(1) requires that plan administrators notify
plan participants and beneficiaries of changes or modifications to the
plan.217 Thus, employees and retirees litigating a section 104(b)(1)
claim must establish that plan administrators failed to notify them of
modifications or changes or had delegated authority to do so to plan
sponsors.218 In Rucker, defendants argued that they did not owe a
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff because they were acting as an employer
or plan managers and thus were not required to give notice to the plain-
tiff when they canceled the LTD benefits.219 The district court con-
cluded that giving notice of a plan termination is a fiduciary
207. Id. at 1456.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1458.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514
U.S. at 82-83.
218. See Rucker, 806 F. Supp. at 1456-57.
219. Id. at 1456.
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responsibility of the plan administrator.220 The court concluded that
providing misleading information is a breach of a fiduciary duty.221
The court noted that that the plaintiff provided evidence showing that
the insurance carrier, Union Mutual Stock Life Insurance Company
(USLIC), had delegated its authority to notify Pacific FM's employees
to Pacific FM.222 Thus it concluded that a triable issue of fact was
raised regarding a breach of a fiduciary duty by defendants in the can-
cellation of their LTD benefits.223 Statutory and policy ambiguities of
ERISA information that is being used by plan administrators and man-
agers affect the disclosure of decisions and their findings. These ambi-
guities also underscore the need for a legal-managerial framework to
integrate law and business, such as human resources and finance, to
discover and assess ERISA-related uncertainties and risks in business
decision-making. Uncertainties regarding applications and interpreta-
tions under ERISA provisions leave the implementation and follow-up
to the decision subject to business changes until trial courts resolve
these ambiguities. But, the financial, legal, managerial and policy
risks are much better understood by plan administrators and manag-
ers when courts resolve them.
A legal-managerial framework includes L-M analysis that weighs
the impact of the decision on public policy during selection, imple-
mentation and follow-up to the decision. This public policy includes
220. Id. at 1457 (citing Willet v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 953 F.2d 1335,
1340 (11th Cir. 1992); Presley v. Blue Cross - Blue Shield of Ala., 744 F. Supp. 1051,
1058 (N.D. Ala. 1990)).
221. Id. at 1457 (citing Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64
(6th Cir. 1988)). See also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (duty to disclose
accurate information).
222. Rucker, 806 F. Supp. at 1457.
223. Id. at 1458. See also Steven Davi, To Tell The Truth: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Disclosure Duties And Employee Standing to Assert Claims under ERISA, 10 St. John's
Legal Comment. 625 (1995) (analysis of fiduciary duties of employers and plan
administrators).
Once the claimants establish that the defendant is the plan administrator and
owes them a fiduciary duty to notify of changes or modifications to the plan, a court
can decide whether section 104(b)(1) applies to a plan termination and whether 210
or more days are prompt or sufficient notification for a plan termination. Rucker, 806
F. Supp. at 1453. In Rucker, the plaintiff alleged that his employer violated ERISA.
The defendant argued that it did not violate ERISA. Id. Defendants argued that they
had notified plaintiff of changes to their employee benefit plan. Id. Defendants'
disclosures did not state that the LTD benefits were being terminated. Id. The
defendants claimed that they had provided plaintiff notice of material changes or
modifications within 210 days. Id. They noted that the plan year ended on December
31, 1990 and that plaintiff knew by July 29, 1991 that the LTD benefits had been
terminated by them. Id.
20021
57
Holloway: The Practical Entry and Utility of a Legal-Managerial Framework w
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEw
the purposes of regulation and common law and present public needs
and their importance, such as health care, to society. The district
court noted that ERISA disclosure and reporting requirements "ensure
that individual participants know[ ] exactly where ... [they stand]
with respect to the plan and . ..enable employees to police their
plans. 224 The court further stated "that these requirements permit
employees 'to bargain further or seek other employment if they are dis-
satisfied with their benefits.' ' ' 22 ' The district court also noted that
defendants' precedent and analysis failed to explain why section
104(b)(1) does not apply to the termination of benefits.226 It weighed
the impact of the elimination of benefits on plan participants 227 and
concluded "a termination leaves the individual without any coverage
whatsoever. '2 28 The court recognized that prompt notification would
give plan participants an opportunity to find alternative means of cov-
erage. 229 It did not define a suitable notification period, but the court
noted that 210 days was not prompt enough.23 ° A legal-managerial
framework recognizes that ERISA analysis and information impose
obligations on administrators and managers, but does not always obli-
gate plan administrators to make timely disclosures to plan partici-
pants. In a legal-managerial framework that evaluates law under
management theories or concepts, a lengthy disclosure period under
ERISA or other statutes gives managers the time to implement and fol-
low-up on plan decisions that affect business organizations, financial
markets and policy environments. Thus, a framework would allow
managers time to prepare for possible disruptive effects of labor, capi-
tal and securities markets and government policy-making and
regulation.
224. Id. at 1459 (citing Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1170 (3d
Cir. 1990)).
225. Id. (citing Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992)).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment,
noting defendants failed to put forth sufficient evidence to establish that they neither
owed nor breached a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, and that they complied with ERISA
procedural requirements. Rucker, 806 F. Supp. at 1460. The district court concluded
that section 104(b)(1) applies to plan terminations and that 210 days to notify of a
plan termination was not prompt enough to protect against such a devastating plan
action under ERISA. Rucker, 806 F. Supp. at 1459. See also Willet v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Ala., 953 F.2d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 1992).
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B. Requiring the Disclosure of the Decision and Its Effects
ERISA analysis and information can require that findings in the
final steps of the process of decision-making be disclosed, though
managers may not be ready or want to disclose these findings or imple-
ment the decision and follow-up its effects on organizations, markets
and society. For example, in Ackerman v. Warnaco, Inc.,23 1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the sec-
tion 104(b)(1) applied to a plan termination. In Ackerman, the plain-
tiffs were 169 former employees "who were in production positions" at
Warnaco's Altoona, Pennsylvania plant.23 2 Warnaco manufactured
fashion apparel.2 3 3 In January 1988, Warnaco published an
"Employee Handbook" (1988 Handbook) and distributed the Hand-
book to its employees.2 3 4 The 1988 Handbook described a severance
benefit or termination allowance policy.2 3 5 It also listed conditions
and circumstances that made employees eligible or ineligible for the
termination allowance.236 One such circumstance was that employees
would "not be entitled to a termination allowance if, prior to termina-
tion of ... [their] employment, management has altered or rescinded
this termination allowance policy."23 7  In a memorandum dated
December 26, 1990, Warnaco rescinded its termination allowance pol-
icy, effective on December 19, 1990.238 The Secretary and Assistant
General Counsel of Warnaco issued the memorandum. 23 9 The memo-
randum stated that a meeting would be held to disclose to employees
the decision to rescind the termination allowance policy.2 40 Compli-
231. 55 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1995).
232. Id. at 119.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 119-120.
238. Id: at 119.
239. Id.
240. Id. Employees alleged that such a meeting was not held at Warnaco's Altoona
plant, though a meeting was held at the Duncanville, Pennsylvania warehouse. Id. At
the meeting at the Duncanville plant, one of Warnaco's vice presidents informed the
employees of the rescission of the termination allowance policy. Id. However, one
employee at the Altoona plant alleged that employees at the Altoona plant had not
received notice of the rescission of the termination allowance policy until January 22,
1992. Id. Employees asserted that the notice was given by a Warnaco Vice President
when he was asked whether they would receive severance benefits that had been
provided under provisions of the 1988 Handbook. Id. This meeting was to discuss
issues raised by the closing of the Altoona plant. Warnaco terminated all of the
employees between October 1991 and January 1992. Id.
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ance by Warnaco with ERISA obligations may still result in litigation
regarding disclosure issues where ERISA is not clear.
Knowing the impact of law-imposed disclosures may still create
uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of a decision to further a com-
pany objective under a particular decision situation. In Ackerman,
Warnaco disclosed its decision to its employees, though some employ-
ees alleged they never received the disclosures under ERISA. Employ-
ees and Warnaco did not dispute that Warnaco published an updated
Employee Handbook in 1991 (1991 Handbook) that reflected an elimi-
nation of the termination allowance policy. 241 They also did not dis-
pute that Warnaco's President informed employees by letter about
"unfavorable economic times, "242 noting "a salary freeze and change in
our severance policy are difficult ... 243 Employees acknowledged
receipt of the letter but considered it to be vague regarding rescission
of the termination allowance policy.244 But employees of Altoona
alleged that they did not receive a copy of the 1991 Handbook.
2 41
They acknowledged that Warnaco distributed the 1991 Handbook to
employees at its other locations.24 6 Warnaco did not produce any evi-
dence that it distributed the 1991 Handbook to its employees at the
Altoona plant. 24 7 Furthermore, the 1991 Handbook or record made
no reference "to the procedure that was followed in eliminating the termi-
nation allowance or the precise date such action was accomplished."248
Warnaco's disclosure reflects economic conditions of the decision sit-
uation. It was a business decision to limit the impact of these condi-
tions on the company objectives, but this disclosure raises questions
regarding the effect of ERISA disclosure procedures on the timeliness
and effectiveness of the plan decision.
Warnaco employees did not agree with Warnaco's business deci-
sion to terminate the plan or the disclosure of the plan termination
decision. The immediate benefits of Warnaco's plan termination were
purely economic, though this decision's consequences were harsh on
employees. Note that in Ackerman, employees filed suit against
Warnaco in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania to recover severance benefits denied them under the 1988
241. Ackerman, 55 F.3d at 119.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id (emphasis added in original).
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Handbook.249 Warnaco moved for summary judgment and argued,
among other things, that it owed no fiduciary duties to the plaintiff
and did not violate any procedural requirements of ERISA.25 0 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for Warnaco. 25 1 The employees
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 252
They argued that section 1024(b)(1)25 3 applied to a complete elimina-
tion of benefits and thus they did not receive timely notice under
ERISA. The Third Circuit concluded that section 1024(b)(1) applied to
the complete elimination of benefits and reversed the district court by
finding that a triable issue of fact existed regarding whether Warnaco's
employees received notice of the termination of benefits.25 4 The Third
Circuit noted that:
Warnaco argues that a termination of benefits is different from an
amendment and is therefore not covered by the language of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b)(1) which speaks of a plan "modification" or "change." We
find this argument unpersuasive for the same reasons we found
Warnaco's argument concerning section 402(b)(3)[, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1102(b)(3),] unpersuasive-we do not believe Congress intended to
protect employees from undisclosed plan amendments, but leave them
defenseless with respect to a plan termination, a change with poten-
tially more dramatic effects.255
The Third Circuit did not decide whether 210 days at the end of
the plan year were prompt enough.256 Ackerman applies section
104(b)(1) to the elimination of employee welfare benefit plans where
the elimination of severance, dental, health care and other benefits
often create social and economic hardships for retirees, employees and
their families and thus imposes disclosure requirements on the latter
steps of the process of decision-making.25 7
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 123.
254. Id. In Ackerman, the Third Circuit also held that the district court must
determine whether Warnaco acted in bad faith, or actively concealed the rescission of
the termination allowance policy. Id.
255. Id. at 123 n.5.
256. Id. at 123-24.
257. Id. at 123. See also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995)
(amending a plan to add a contingency that could eventually eliminate the benefits
plan); Gregory J. Osso, It Doesn't Add Up: The Broken Promises of Lifetime Health
Benefits, Medicare, and Accounting Rule FAS 106 Do Not Equal Satisfactory Medical
Coverage for Returns, 13 J. Contemp. Health L. Pol'y 233 (1996) (discussing promises
breached by employers under employee benefits plans).
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Obviously plan managers want to disclose findings, conclusions
and decisions of the process of decision-making when their effects
have a lesser impact or influence business, government or community.
The timely, effective disclosure of decisions and their findings and
conclusions limit disruptive reactions and permit well-planned deci-
sional responses during implementation and follow-up of the deci-
sions. Yet the consequences of disclosures on business, government
and the community are not entirely certain, especially when public
policy or law is not entirely clear. Under Ackerman's decision situa-
tion, a legal-managerial framework points out quickly that ERISA anal-
ysis and information, on one hand, do not prohibit a business decision
to terminate or amend an employee benefits plan, but notes that ERISA
analysis and information, on the other hand, will definitely affect the
timing of the selection, implementation and follow-up to a decision,
and thus creates new decisional risks and liabilities in the process of
decision-making. These new risks and liabilities are law-imposed
uncertainties in business decision-making.
Using a legal-managerial framework shows how ERISA analysis
and information affect the process of decision-making and thus
requires plan managers and administrators to understand legal, labor,
financial and policy effects of benefit plan decisions. Often, these bus-
iness decisions rest squarely on the outcomes of legal issues and pol-
icy concerns that are within gray areas. Such gray-area decisions do
not permit certain or conclusive legal advice through any present anal-
ysis and information. Litigation is ample proof. Uncertainty in the
decision-making process caused by the need to address gray area
issues requires that legal issues and policy concerns be examined
under an analytical framework that would take in consideration busi-
ness and economic concepts and social and political conditions before
disclosing a business decision and its findings and thinking. A mana-
gerial analysis with law addresses gray area issues that often are uncer-
tain or unstable in decision-making, by using business theories and
principles to ascertain more precisely policy and legal risks in the pro-
cess of decision-making, including implementation and follow-up.
Gray-area issues regarding the meaning and application of law can
The application of ERISA disclosure standards to the disclosure of an early
retirement benefit that is still under consideration and in the process of decision-
making (perhaps even an alternative) demonstrates the impact of ERISA analysis and
information on business methodology and thinking. See Michael J. Collins, It's
Common, But Is It Right? The Common Law of Trusts in ERISA Fiduciary Litigation, 16
Lab. Law. 391, 400-12 (2001).
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often make decisional disclosure disruptive to the selection, implemen-
tation and follow-up to the decision.
C. Requiring a Dual Decision-Making Process to Disclose Information
ERISA analysis and information demonstrate the need for a legal-
managerial framework to uncover how business has influenced policy-
making to make regulation and why business should weigh the impact
of the decision on public policy in the selection, implementation and
follow-up steps of the decision-making process. Many seemingly
unnoticed decisions of companies have an incremental effect on public
policy-making by creating unwanted or unneeded problems that are
inconsistent with public needs and wants. The cumulative effects of
these decisions can lead to regulation, such as ERISA and its amend-
ments, that imposes mandatory obligations on companies and their
managers. Regulation requires or encourages employers to provide for
the safety, health and welfare needs of retirees, employees and their
dependents. Such mandates affect both business methodology and
thinking, such as requiring the considerations of policy concerns in
incremental decisions of unrelated decision-makers and requiring
changes in the particular decision-making process. For example, an
amendment to section 104(b)(1) by the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996258 (HIPAA) is implemented by admin-
istrative regulations that do not clearly include a complete plan elimi-
nation as a material reduction in covered services but definitely do
provide prompt notice for a modification and an elimination of some
benefits.25 9 Rucker concluded that 210 or more days were not
prompt,2 60 and HIPAA significantly reduces the notice period for
health care benefits.26 ' The HIPAA amendment to section 104(b)(1)
states that:
If there is a modification or change described in section 102(a)(1),
that is a material reduction in covered services and benefits provided
under a group health plan (as defined in section 733(a)(1), a summary
description of such modification or change shall be furnished to par-
258. Pub. L. 104-191, § 101(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1951 (1996), codified as amended at, 29
U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (hereinafter HIPAA), amends section 104(b)(1) by creating
an exception for particular changes or modifications to group health care plans. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(b)(1).
259. See infra notes 270-274 and accompanying text.
260. Rucker, 806 F. Supp. at 1459. See also Willet v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Ala., 953 F.2d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 1992) (The court of appeals concludes that 210
days was not prompt enough.).
261. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
2002]
63
Holloway: The Practical Entry and Utility of a Legal-Managerial Framework w
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2002
CAMPBELL LAW REvIEW
ticipants and beneficiaries not later than 60 days after the date of the
adoption of the modification or change. In the alternative, the plan
sponsor may provide such description at regular intervals of not more
than 90 days.262
The HIPAA amendment includes some significant requirements
that affect accessibility and portability of group health insurance
plans.2 6 3 The most significant is the prompt notice of 60 days after the
adoption of the change or modification to health care benefits plans.264
This amendment creates different substantive requirements for health
care and non-health care benefits of employee benefits plans and may
require a different decision-making process for health care plans.
The cumulative impact on public policy of unrelated decision-
makers making the same decision always causes a broad legislative
response, such as ERISA, and thus HIPAA and other regulation may
not limit managerial discretion of an entire field, such as employee
benefits. In regulating the provision of non-health care benefits, the
requirements of section 104(b)(1) still give plan managers great mana-
gerial discretion that permits the disclosure of decisions with mini-
mum disruption in the implementation and follow-up steps of the
decision-making process. These requirements permit plan administra-
tors to wait at least 210 days after the end of the plan year to notify
plan participants and beneficiaries of plan changes or modifications,
and if a change was made on January 1, the plan administrator could
take 574 days to notify plan participants and beneficiaries.265 The
HIPAA amendment requires prompt disclosure of a material reduction
cause by a plan change or modification to health care services and
benefits. The administrative regulations that implement the HIPAA
amendment to section 104(b)(1)266 define a material reduction in cov-
ered health care services and benefits as follows:
(3) "Material Reduction". (i) ... [A] "material reduction in cov-
ered services or benefits" means any modification to the plan or
change in the information required to be included in the summary
plan description that, independently or in conjunction with other con-
temporaneous modifications or changes, would be considered by the
average plan participant to be an important reduction in covered ser-
vices or benefits under the plan.267
262. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
263. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
264. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
265. Kytle v. Stewart Title Company, 788 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
266. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-3 (2002).
267. Id. at § 2520.104b-3(d)(3)(i).
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The HIPAA regulations explicitly affect communications between
plan administrators and plan participants by requiring administrators
to scrutinize welfare benefit plan decisions to ascertain whether these
decisions could, singly or jointly with other plan decisions, result in a
material reduction in covered services and benefits. 268 HIPAA
imposes an obligation that benefit plan managers should have recog-
nized long ago. It is managerially problematic to fail to disclose the
termination of health care benefits during an exponential growth in
health care policy. Should we blame managers? No. The lack of a
legal-managerial framework to evaluate the ultimate impact of the
incremental effects of hundreds of plan decisions on heated health care
policy is absent in both law and business.
A managerial analysis with law cannot eliminate the uncertainty
created by administrative regulations, precedents, common law princi-
ples and statutes, but it is an analytical, reasoned framework to evalu-
ate legal and public policy questions. The framework also enters L-M
analysis with legal information in gray area decision-making, which
usually creates the greatest uncertainty. To illustrate, earlier regula-
tions did not define a modification or change but noted that under
section 104(b)(1), a modification or change must be material. 269 Thus
courts must define a material modification or change in disputes
involving the loss of pension and welfare benefits. 270 Administrative
regulations that implement the HIPAA amendment list plan transac-
tions that are a reduction in covered services and benefits. 27' These
regulations state that:
(ii) A "reduction in covered services or benefits" generally would
include any plan modification or change that eliminates benefits paya-
ble under the plan, including a reduction that occurs as a result of a
change in formulas methodologies or schedules that serve as the basis
for making benefit determinations; increases deductibles, co-pay-
ments, or other amounts to be paid by a participant or beneficiary;
reduces the service area covered by a health maintenance organization;
establishes new conditions or requirements (e.g., preauthorization
requirements) to obtaining services or benefits under the plan.2 72
268. See id. See also Curtiss-Wright Corp., 514 U.S. at 82-83 (The Court observes
that plan administrator should screen day-to-day communications to determine the
effects on the administration of the plan.).
269. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-3(a) (2002).
270. See Baker v. Lukens Steel Co., 79 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1986) (The deletion of a
form from an early retirement package was a material modification.).
271. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-3(d)(3)(ii) (2002).
272. Id.
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These regulations do not explicitly state that section 104(b)(1)
applies to a complete elimination of benefits and thus could definitely
raise gray area issues in the process of decision-making, most notably
in evaluating alternatives and selecting the decision. The regulations
state that section 104(b)(1) "include[s] any plan modification or
change that eliminates benefits payable under the plan .... One
interpretation of such language is that section 104(b)(1) applies to an
elimination of benefits under the plan. The pertinent language is any
"plan modification or change '2 74 that results or causes an elimination
of benefits and services. A plan modification or change does not nec-
essarily include a plan termination, though a plan termination would
also completely eliminate benefits. A plan termination is a unilateral
decision of a plan manager who is not acting as a plan administrator
under ERISA, and must make decisions under uncertainty. Absolute
certainty is not a requirement of business decision-making and thus a
legal-managerial framework must automatically address the liability
and other consequences of decision-making under uncertainty.
Weighing the impact of public policy that leads to broad regula-
tion is justified by the impact of regulation on business methodology
and thinking, such as a reduction in managerial discretion. ERISA reg-
ulations that implement HIPAA do not list a plan termination as a
transaction covered by section 104(b)(1) of ERISA. They explicitly list
unilateral plan decisions (changes or modifications) that would elimi-
nate particular benefits or services. Section 104(b)(1) interpretation
by courts provides ERISA analysis and more information. If ERISA
analysis and information of these interpretations apply to plan termi-
nations, they could affect business decision-making by making the
plan management less flexible and responsive to market, government
and economic conditions. This inflexibility results if management pre-
maturely discloses plan decisions that are business actions under
accounting, finance or other business functions that also affects busi-
ness decisions of labor, financial, securities and other markets.275
ERISA analysis and information force managers to consider the
social and economic consequences of disclosing business information
and other findings and thinking of decision-making. However, ERISA
analysis and information also force managers to weigh the public pol-
icy effects of imposing hardships on employees and retirees. ERISA
analysis and information include policy analysis and information to
scrutinize the effect of plan decisions on an employee, retiree or depen-
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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dents. Therefore, a managerial analysis with law evaluates the impact
of ERISA on business thinking and then enters through the delivery
and use of ERISA analysis and information into the process of business
decision-making. Poor plan decisions by business organizations beget
regulation that is a direct response to existing public policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
A managerial analysis with law is a legal-managerial framework
for the entry and use of law and public policy in the process of busi-
ness decision-making. Prior to this entry and utilization, a managerial
analysis with law would use management, finance and other business
theories to evaluate the impact of law and public policy on business
theories and other thinking. Moreover, a managerial analysis with law
provides entry and utility through legal-analytic methodology. Analyti-
cal methodology of law and business integrate to form L-M analysis
and to accompany legal information, which, in turn, produces specific
findings and thinking in the process of business decision-making. A
managerial analysis with law includes addressing the impact of law
and public policy on business methodology and thinking through
pedagogy, theory and practice of business and legal disciplines. This
article examined the practicality of using a legal-managerial framework
in the process of business decision-making or business methodology
and left pedagogy and theory for another time.
Under a managerial analysis with law that includes a legal-mana-
gerial framework, business concepts apply to law and public policy to
examine and explain the validity, necessity and utility of common law,
regulation and public policy. Such evaluation should take place long
before law and public policy affect the decision-making process that
uses L-M analysis and legal information. ERISA analysis and informa-
tion is not novel in business methodology and thinking. Employers
must use ERISA to establish and maintain employee benefit plans for
their employees. These plans provide retirement, post-employment
and employment welfare and security for employees, retirees and their
dependents. 27 6 These plans generally include both welfare benefits 27 7
and pension benefits.27 8 Welfare benefits such as life insurance,
276. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(1994 & Supp. IV 1998); supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
277. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1 (2002);
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
278. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2 (2002);
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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dependent care, and health care provide security, 279 but they do not
vest at retirement and thus can be terminated at anytime by employ-
ers.28° Employers provide these benefits to their employees to attract
and maintain a stable work force.281 Consequently, employee benefits
are still under the control of plan managers who are subject to ERISA
analysis and information, but these managers exercise corporate
authority to make benefit plan decisions within the bounds of permis-
sible managerial discretion that is governed by business methodology
and thinking.
Common law principles, analysis and thinking gave, and still give,
plan managers and administrators much latitude in managing and
administering both welfare and pension benefits. 28 2 The common law
did not rely on management concepts and thinking to explain its prin-
ciples, analysis and thinking. Often managers make decisions that
later show little regard for finance, accounting, management and other
business theories and principles. Yet they defend these decisions
based on their rights to manage as they see fit, i.e., making profits and
reducing costs. They often overlook public policy. In fact, government
efforts to advance public policy rarely, if at all, involve saving money or
making profits for business organizations of our society. Public policy
needs provide public benefits and programs that alleviate public and
private hardships that are caused by irrational or inept business deci-
sions and practices for a particular time and place. Obviously, much
common law and its thinking, such as the employment-at-will doc-
trine, do not inherently fit the complexity of today's business markets,
government regulation and public policy, when they are implemented
through a non-analytical framework that cannot weigh effects and
influences caused by law and public policy on business methodology
and thinking.
ERISA's impact on business functions, economic markets and
public policy illustrate in several ways the need for a legal-managerial
framework to evaluate the impact of law and then enter L-M analysis
with legal information in the process of business decision-making.
279. Staff of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong., Second Sess.,
Emptying the Elderly's Pocketbook- Growing Impact of Rising Health Care Costs 23-31
(Comm. Print 1990) (Hereinafter cited as Emptying the Elderly's Pocketbook); A. C.
Enthoven, Retiree Health Benefits as a Public Policy Issue, in RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS:
WHAT IS THE PROMISE? 4-4 (Employee Benefit Research Institute, ed., 1989).
280. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
281. See Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 Colum. L. Rev.
909, 917 (1970); D. L. Glifford & C. A. Seltz, FUNDAMENTALS OF FLEXIBLE
COMPENSATION 5 (1988).
282. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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THE UTILITY OF A LEGAL-MANAGERIAL FRAMEWORK
First, ERISA analysis and information affect the process of decision-
making by requiring companies to disclose more information and
findings, thus requiring managers to understand the complete effects
of legal requirements and issues on business decisions and their con-
sequences. Second, ERISA analysis and information affect business
principles and theories that govern reactions and responses by manag-
ers to the impact of the regulation on organizational decisions and
objectives. A managerial analysis with law looks for a rational basis or
ground under business concepts for business decisions that must
address rational concerns and points of law and public policy. Third,
ERISA analysis and information demand that managers pay close
attention to public policy concerns in the selection, implementation
and follow-up of decisions. A managerial analysis with law weighs
how social and other policies affect business decision-making and how
regulation implements social and other policy goals to achieve public
ends. Fourth, ERISA analysis and information are evidence that busi-
ness and government need to address more closely interrelated public
needs and business objectives. Managerial analysis with law examines
the connection between public ends and business interests. Business
often complies with new regulation, but then finds another public pol-
icy concern to exacerbate. Business and law share a vicious cycle in
the absence of managerial analysis with lawbecause too many poor
decisions beget more regulation. A legal-managerial framework
requires management to consider law and public policy in the begin-
ning through the end of the decision-making process. A managerial
analysis with law evaluates the impact of law and public policy and
guides the entry and utility of legal analysis and information in busi-
ness methodology and thinking, including finance, accounting, mar-
keting, management and decision sciences.
Managerial analysis with law studies the impact of law and public
policy on business methodology and thinking rather than relying
solely on the "bottom-line," common law thinking that is profits for
today and precedents of yesterday, respectively.
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